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FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG'
ADVERTISING AND LABELING
GARY' L. BOLAND*
In recognition of the potentially hazardous nature of certain med-
icines, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was authorized by
Congress in 1938 to monitor the manufacture, promotion, and sale of
drugs.' FDA regulation, following the pattern which has recently pre-
vailed in the control of product and environmental hazards, has shifted
from reliance primarily on sanctions imposed after the fact of injury
attributable to drug use, toward the establishment of specific preventive
regulations. The Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962,2 for ex-
ample, the first major change in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act of 1938,8 conferred on the FDA broad discretionary powers for the
issuance of such regulations.' These 'regulations aroused more drug-
industry opposition than the statutory provisions authorizing them, 6
and have led to the first law suits challenging FDA rules since the pas-
sage of the Act.'
This article examines FDA jurisdiction over the advertising and
labeling of prescription drugs. Both prescription and over-the-counter
medicines fall within the Act's definition of "drugs" 7
 as any article
intended8 to prevent or treat disease, or intended to affect the structure
or function of the body. The Durham-Humphrey Amendment of 1951,°
however, established separate legal categories for prescription and non-
prescription drugs. Drugs which are too hazardous for self-medication
and which, therefore, can be obtained only with a doctor's prescription,
are prescription or ethical drugs." These drugs are promoted exclu-
* B.A., J.D., University of Oklahoma. Member of Oklahoma Bar.
I Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Food and Drug Act].
2 Drug Amendments of 1962, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Drug Amendments of 1962).
8 52 Stat, 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964).
4 The 1962 Amendments give the FDA broad discretionary power to make regula-
tions designed to be more specific than the statute. Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962,
38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1082 (1963).
6 Kelly, Three Years Later, 21 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 21, 23-24 (1966).
6 Id. The suits are discussed infra.
7 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1964).
8 The manufacturer's intent, which may be demonstrated by advertising or labeling,
is a key factor in determining whether an article is a drug. Note, The Drug Amendments
of 1962, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1082, 1086 (1963).
9
 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (amended by the Drug Amendments of 1962), 21 U.S.C.
§ 353(b) (1964), amending Food and Drug Act, § 503(b), 52 Stat. 1051 (1938).
10
 The term "ethical drug" may refer to all drugs primarily advertised to doctors,
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sively to the medical profession," while over-the-counter, or propri-
etary drugs are advertised and sold directly to the public. FDA
regulation of the labeling of over-the-counter drugs," and Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) regulation of advertising for such drugs"
are beyond the scope of this article.
Since each piece of written material published by or on behalf of
the manufacturer of a drug concerning his product is either advertising
or labeling as those terms are used in the Act, this article traces sepa-
rately the regulations governing prescription drug advertising and those
governing prescription drug labeling. Whenever identical or similar
regulations govern a particular aspect of both advertising and labeling,
the significance of the issue involved is examined fully under advertis-
ing, and the regulations merely summarized under labeling. In each
area where the federal government has acted, the article explores the
need for regulation, the statutory scheme as proposd to deal with the
problem and as finally enacted into law," the regulations proposed and
issued to implement the statutory purposes, industry reaction, and the
extent of compliance. The article concludes with an examination of the
standard of care owed to the public in the promotion of prescription
drugs, and an evaluation of the potential liability of physicians, drug
manufacturers and the federal government in drug reaction cases.
and thus includes certain over-the-counter medicines. Finguette, Authority, Drugs and
the Practice of Medicine, 16 Food Drug Cosm. L.j. 393, 395 n.8 (1961) ; May, Selling
Drugs by "Educating" Physicians, 36 J. Med. Educ. 1, 9 (1961).
11 Prescription drugs are sometimes indirectly advertised to the lay public. Manu-
facturers often "plant" articles on new drugs in newspapers and magazines. S. Rep. No.
448, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1961); Rheingold, Products Liability—The Ethical Drug
Manufacturer's Liability, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 947, 967 (1964). In fact, the FDA denounced
"excessive publicity" in unnamed lay publications regarding the purported wonder-drug
properties of DMSO (dirnethyI sulf oxide), an experimental drug. The publicity led to the
creation of a "gray market" as patients sought the drug for conditions ranging from
arthritis to nervous disorders. From 20,000 to 50,000 persons received the drug from
authorized and unauthorized sources while clinical trials usually involve only about 1,000
persons. The FDA suspended clinical testing of the drug. Washington Post, March 10,
1966, at 1, col. 5. See also The Story of DMSO, 192 J.A.M.A. 320 (1965), criticizing
premature favorable reports appearing in eight major lay magazines and on one televi-
sion program.
12 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1964).
18 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. f§ 52-57 (1964).
19 The legislative history of the 1962 Drug Amendments, including the four versions
of the Senate bill, the two House bills, the debate in Ccingress and the enacted statute,
has been compiled in Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n, The Drug Amendments of 1962:
Legislative History: Reports, Bills, Debate, Act (1964). For a livery account of the
behind the scene maneuvering during consideration of the Amendments, see R. Harris,
The Real Voice (1964). For background information on the 1938 Act, see Cavers, The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Pro-
visions, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 2 (1939).
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Part I. PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVERTISING
A. Introduction
1. Definition of Advertising
The terms "advertising" and "labeling" as used in the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act do not totally correspond to their lay
connotations of promotional and informational literature. The term
"labeling" has been defined' to include the display of written material
on the immediate container of a drug presenting vital prescription in-
formation, any printed matter on a drug's containers or wrappers, and
any promotional or other material "accompanying such article."'
Classified as labeling are brochures, mailing pieces, detailing pieces,
literature reprints, reference publications containing manufacturer-
supplied data, and similar literature disseminated to physicians." Any
residual promotional literature concerning a drug is advertising?
Prior to the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments, the Food
and Drug Administration lacked jurisdiction over prescription drug
advertising. As a result, that agency gave an expansive interpretation to
the term "accompanying" so as to give labeling a broad construction
and bring much of the informational type of drug promotion under
FDA control? The FDA thus regulated direct mail advertising to
doctors, as well as material left in doctors' offices by detail men, or drug
industry salesmen." As the definition of labeling expanded, the defini-
tion of advertising contracted to cover only newspaper and magazine
advertisements and radio and television commercials. 2' This segment
of drug promotion fell under the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission.22
However narrow in definition, advertising was large in quantity
and continued to play an important role in drug promotion. In 1967,
for example, 42.8 percent (13.6 million) of the American Medical
Association's revenue of $31.7 million was derived from advertising,
including pharmaceutical ads placed in its various publications. The
16
 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (1964) ; 21 C.F.R. § 1.2 (1969); 21
C.F.R. § 1.105(1) (1969).
10
 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) (1964).
17
 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(e) (2) (1969).
19
 Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1082, 1124 (1963) ; H.
Toulmin, Law of Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics § 24.6 (2d ed. 1963) (Sup!). 1969); 108
Cong. Rec. 22040 (1962) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
19
 Note, Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 Rutgers L. Rev.
101, 124 (1963). See Alberty Food Prods. v. United States, 194 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1952).
20
 Larrick, Current Federal Drug Controls for Problems Old and New, 16 Food
Drug Cosm. L.J. 679, 680 (1961).
21 Kleinfeld, More Legislation?, 20 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 623, 625 (1965).
22
 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
	 52-57 (1964).
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Journal of the. American Medical Association, in 1963, carried nearly
6,000 advertising pages. In 1958, the drug industry paid for 3,790,908
pages of advertisements in medical journals." In 1959, industry
costs for journal ads and direct mail impressions totaled $125,000,000,
up 219 percent from 1953, and only part of an aggregate $750,000,000
spent on all forms of promotion."
2. Deficiencies in FTC Regulation of Advertising
Despite this enormous quantity of drug advertising, the Federal
Trade Commission's power of control remained "ill-defined and seldom-
used."25 Advertisements directed solely at the medical profession—
so long as they listed quantitative ingredient information for the drug
and contained no misrepresentation of a material fact—were spe-
cifically excluded from FTC control. 2° This exception may have bad
merit prior to the prescription drug "revolution" 27 which occurred at
the end of Wand War II, for until then, the number of drugs available
was relatively limited, and a doctor could fend for himself in selecting
medicines. He needed little protection either from the law or from
regulatory agencies. The current crop of drugs, however, adds new
information at a rate a doctor cannot hope to absorb while practicing
his profession,28
 thus altering the situation and threatening to nullify
his skills by antiquating his education and training. The physician's
dilemma is amplified by the rule of law that members of the profession
must keep abreast of the times and follow approved methods in
general use.
The role of the doctor as the purveyor of drug products is of prime
importance since he is the vehicle by which the prescription medication
is transferred from the manufacturer to the consumer. Since the doctor
cannot hope to ferret out all vital information concerning drugs for
himself, he must usually obtain his knowledge from the manufacturer.
As a result, most of the information concerning drug products which
comes to the attention of the average physician is either heralded by
the detail men of the drug companies, whose primary interest is to push
their products, or gleaned from drug company advertising in one form
or another. This is where the problems of both the doctor and the
patient begin.
28 R. Harris, The Real Voice 188 (1964).
24 May, supra note 10, at 5, 7. See generally S. Rep. No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
156-65 (1961).
25 M. Mintz, The Therapeutic Nightmare 106 n.4 (1965).
26 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52-57 (1964).
21 M. Mintz, supra note 25, at 50.
28
 The National Library of Medicine has estimated that about 200,000 articles on
drugs are published each year.
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Ninety percent of all prescriptions written by physicians today
call for drugs introduced within the past 15 years." More importantly,
drug advertising today not only sells new products, but also informs
the physician of the existence and claimed effectiveness of these
products. An AMA study, for example, disclosed that medical journal
advertising provided "perhaps the largest source of information to
practitioners" about newly discovered drugs8° Forced to "contend with
subtle overpowering promotion and the complexities of modern med-
icine," today's doctor can no longer effectively fend for himself, "espe-
cially if he is to be 'educated' by the very purveyors of products which
require his prescriptions." 31
Congressional hearings held in 1958 32 revealed abuses in the ad-
vertising of tranquilizers, and uncertainty as to the extent of FTC
policing powers." In addition, FTC officials themselves criticized their
limited jurisdiction, especially over drug ads which failed to list side
effects or contraindications." Responsible doctors also questioned the
propriety of educating physicians through advertisements. Pointing
out that many doctors assume that at least some reputable firms con-
sistently disseminate reliable information, Dr. Charles D. May wrote
in the Journal of Medical Education:
The traditional independence of physicians and the welfare of
the public are being threatened by the new vogue among drug
manufacturers to promote their products by assuming an ag-
gressive role in the "education" of doctors ... Is the public
likely to benefit if practicing physicians and medical edu-
cators must perform their duties amidst the clamor and
striving of merchants seeking to increase the sales of drugs by
conscripting "education" in the service of promotion? Is it
prudent for physicians to become greatly dependent upon
pharmaceutical manufacturers for support of scientific jour-
20 DeHaen, Compilation of New Drugs, 33 American Prof. Pharm. 25 (1968). In
1968, 452 drug applications were cleared by the FDA, and notices to the FDA of drug
studies begun on human beings increased from 671 in fiscal year 1968 to 858 in 1969.
Annual Report of Health, Education, and Welfare 315, 326 (1968).
BO See generally 108 Cong. Rec. 21063-1091 (1962) ; S. Rep. No, 448, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 190 (1961).
31 May, supra note 10, at 8-9.
22
 See Hearings on False and Misleading Advertising (Prescription Tranquilizing
Drugs) Before the Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
83 Id. at 159-70.
84 Moore, Regulation of Deceptive Practices by the Federal Trade Commission, 16
Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 102, 115 (1961) ; Williams, The Federal Trade Commission and
Food, Drug and Ccismetic Advertising, 16 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 229, 237 (1961);
S. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission 37, 47, 69 (1970).
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nals and medical societies, for entertainment, and now also
for a large part of their education? 35
Another physician has charged, moreover, that the "persuasive propa-
ganda of advertising literature and of visiting detail men" causes
physicians to shift repeatedly and needlessly from one drug to another:
Doctors are being systematically brainwashed by expensive
advertising in the pages of medical journals, by the daily
influx of mountains of advertising mail, by free throw-away
"educational" pamphlets published by commercial agencies
for the promotion of drug sales, and by visiting detail men,
who go from door to door of physicians' offices leaving elab-
orate samples of new drugs and valueless combinations of old
drugs, together with reams of impressive but biased litera-
ture. It is utterly impossible for most busy physicians to
separate the wheat from the chaff in this enormous volume
of information and misinformation."
3. Regulation of Drug Promotion Under the 1962 Amendments
Hearings held by Senator Estes Kefauver before the Senate Sub-
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly in 1961 and 1962 3T focused on
abuses in drug advertising. Out of these hearings developed the 1962
Drug Amendments. Because advertising may constitute a substantial
part of the post-graduate education of practicing physicians," the
1962 Amendments place a greater responsibility than did the 1938 Act
upon the pharmaceutical industry to present factual and undistorted
information to physicians." More importantly, the 1962 Amendments
grant to the FDA jurisdiction to regulate prescription drug adver-
tising," while assigning control over non-prescription drug advertising
to the FTC. 4' Although FDA regulations issued under the 1962 Amend-
ments have imposed similar disclosure and other requirements on both
25 May, supra note 10, at 1.
88
 Baehr, Drug Costs and the Consumer, Drugs in Our Society 182 (Talaly ed. 1964).
87
 Hearings on S. 1552 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1961-62) [hereinafter cited as
Kefauver Hearings).
88
 Goodrich, Responsibilities and Problems of Government, Drugs in Our Society
146 (Talaly ed. 1964); Garland, Dissemination of Information on Drugs to the Physician,
Drugs in Our Society 203 (Talaly ed. 1964) ; Dowling, How Do Practicing Physicians
Use New Drugs?, 185 J.A.M.A. 233 (1963); Rheingold, Products Liability—The Ethical
Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 947, 965-68 (1964).
89 Sadusk, Planning in the Food and Drug Administration for Regulation of Prescrip-
tion Drug Advertising, 20 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 299 (1965).
90 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1964).
41 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-57 (1964). See generally
Dougherty, Current Problems in Food and Drug Advertising, 21 Food Drug Cosm. L.J.
161. (1966).
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advertising and labeling," the distinction between the two kinds of
printed drug literature remains important; for example, side effects
must be fully stated in labeling, but may be summarized in advertising."
While the FDA now regulates direct mail promotion and adver-
tising in medical journals, the statute did not specifically give the
agency authority over oral promotional statements made by detail
men.44 These salesmen for the pharmaceutical industry, making an
estimated 18 to 20 million calls a year on doctors and druggists," are
an important source of information concerning new drugs." The orig-
inal version of the 1962 Amendments included a provision authorizing
FDA regulation of oral promises in advertising'" This provision would
have required detailers to supply the generic name and warnings for
drugs. Absent such a definitive rule, promotional statements by de-
tailers cannot easily be categorized as either labeling or advertising."
The FDA does, however, have jurisdiction over literature left with
doctors by detailers." In addition, it could be argued that false oral
claims for a drug indicate that the directions for use stated in the
drug's labeling are inadequate, and that the drug is, therefore, mis-
branded. 6°
FDA regulation of prescription drug advertising can be divided
into three general areas. The first concerns the promulgation of rules
controlling drug names. Related to these requirements are FDA regula-
tions compelling disclosure of certain essential ingredient information.
The second is the mandatory listing of information needed before
prescribing a drug—its side effects, contraindications, and warnings.
The last area concerns FDA regulation of the content of drug advertise-
ments to insure that the limits of the drug's effectiveness are accurately
portrayed.
Discussion of the requirement and the importance of full dis-
closure in prescription drug labeling must lead to consideration of the
"brief summary" concept which applies to prescription drug adver-
42 Compare 21. C.F.R. § 1.105(a)-(d) (1) (1969) with 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(a), (c),
(g), (h)(1) (1969).
43 Contrast 21 C.F.R. 1.106(b) (3) (i) and § 1.106(b) (4) (i) (1969) with 21 C.F.R.
§ 1.105(e) (1969).
44 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Task Force on Prescription
Drugs, V Background Papers 29 (1968).
46 Harris, supra note 23, at 89.
46 Note 44 supra at 30.
47 S. 1552 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (7) (1961) (Drug Industry Antitrust Act).
48 Willig, The Medical Detailer and the New Drug Amendments of 1962, 20 Food
Drug Cosm. L.J. 221 (1965).
42 Such literature is considered labeling. Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962, 38
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1082, 1124 n.353 (1963).
60 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (1964); 21 C.F.R. 1.106(a) (1) ( 1969) ;
21 C.F.R. § 1.106(o) (1969). See also Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C, § 321(n) (1964).
209
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tising." The brief summary concept requires a "true statement of
information in brief summary relating to side effects, contraindications,
and effectiveness" in all prescription drug advertisements except "re-
minder" , advertisements and advertisements of bulk-sale drugs, or
drugs used as prescription chemicals or compounding necessities, where
no claim is made for the therapeutic safety or effectiveness of the drug.'
In 21 C.F.R. Section 1.105(e) (1), the FDA analogized its dis-
tinction of labeling from advertising to that between the intentional
torts of slander and libel. It has equated the qualities of labeling to
those which determine that matter is libelous rather than slanderous.
In short, where promotional and directional information proceeds from
a written script, even though thereafter it achieves publication via
electronic, mechanical, radio or televisory means, the initial pre-planned
writing, typing or printing is considered to be within the scope of the
labeling definition of the Act. This is consistent with the agency's
earlier attempts to collect and inspect "canned" scripts provided by
the manufacturer to detail men whose task it was to commit these
scripts to memory and repeat them to their physician contacts.
Although medical or professional detailing is a form of agent
representation recognized by the courts," it is not defined as labeling
or advertising. Scientific observations and testimonials rendered by
doctors or other individuals not associated with the manufacturer are
also exempt from FDA regulation. However, if the manufacturer
should adopt the testimonials or observations, they are treated as an
advertising claim rather than merely as an individual opinion."•
Other information which may appear includes a description of the
dosage form, the quantitative content of the package, its price, and the
name and address of the manufacturer or individual introducing it into
interstate commerce. Any other graphic, written or printed matter
appearing thereon must contain no representation or suggestion con-
cerning claims or directions for usage relating to the advertised drug.
In the case of "reminder ads," the prior rule was that so long as
the advertisement was based solely on the prestige of the name of the
product or of the manufacturer, and neither made a claim nor directed
usage, it was exempt from regulation. Presently, however, the sphere
of reminder ads is so restricted that the attractiveness of such ads to
the sponsor is limited. Reminder advertisements may contain only the
proprietary ("brand" or "trade") name, plus, as required, the estab-
lished name and quantitative formula as they appear on the label of
the drug package. The privilege of reminder ad exemption may be
51. 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(e) (1970).
52 Id,
68 Wechsler v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 198 Misc. 540, 99 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1950).
64 United States -v. John J. Fulton Co., 33 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1929).
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withdrawn on notice by the Commissioner if he finds that the drug as
used has a propensity for fatalities or serious damage."
In preparing section 1.105, the FDA no doubt felt that in the
interest of promulgatory tidiness, the advertising regulation should
achieve a symmetry in scope with its labeling antecedent, section 1.106,
and, therefore, included bulk-sale drugs. Aside from the doubtful logic,
the doubtful authority is manifest. Such drugs and chemicals are
advertised in the trade among scientifically knowledgeable people.
If a manufacturer or other distributor feels that his process of com-
minution, solution, or precipitation makes for a more efficient or effi-
cacious product, he and his statements are measured in the marketplace
by his peers, and from the vantage point of their knowledge and ex-
perience. This is not the disadvantaged general consumer that legisla-
tors had in mind when section 502(n) came into being.
The courts have held that advertising copy which is so much at
variance with labeling as to be false or misleading in any particular
is misbranding the product." Therefore, paragraphs (3), (4) and (5)
contained in the new section 1.105 (e) seem to be superfluous. No doubt
they would have value as internal memoranda for training personnel
involved in the fabrication and screening of prescription drug adver-
tisements. However, outside of the mechanics of identification written
into the basic statute and some initial regulation, the most important
judgment that must be made by the ad sponsor or regulator is whether
in substance and design, in its totality, this prescription drug advertise-
ment seen by an average physician of ordinary prudence would mislead
him, intentionally or not, as to its prescription or administration in
terms of its safety and usefulness for his patient's needs.
Section 1.105(e) (3) states that untrue or misleading information
in any part of an advertisement is not considered cured by providing
in another part of the advertisement a brief statement of accurate
information concerning side effects, contraindications and the effective-
ness of the product. Further, since this paragraph promotes a total view
of the advertisement, inadequate qualification or information with
regard to any statement or theme requires, at least, concise notice to
the effect that some qualification exists, and a prominent reference on
each page to the fact that the reader or viewer has available a more
complete discussion of such qualification or information elsewhere in
the same advertisement.
Section 1.105(e) (5) redundantly assails the concept of brief sum-
mary as requiring a fair balance in the presentation of the "pros" and
5 5
 See Hoge, An Appraisal of the New Drug and ,Cosmetic Legislation, 6 Law &
Contemn. Prob. 111 (1941)
58. United States v. Honey Cancer Clinic, 198 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1952).
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"cons" of the drug. Imbalance is permissible, however, if by some form
of measurement, the brief summary is comparable in depth and detail
between such "pros" and "cons." This regulation also repeats the
admonition from the labeling regulations that descriptions of the sort
required here must relate to the particular advertisement, and not omit
material facts required to be revealed.
Section 1.105(e) (6) describes twenty types of prescription drug
advertisements which would reveal non-compliance with the regula-
tions by the sponsor." The patterns describe advertisements that are
false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading or violative of
Section 502 (n) of the Act. With regard to specific advertisements,
however, and upon petition by the manufacturer or sponsor to the
FDA for a waiver, the FDA may find that despite any incidental
resemblance to the patterns, the advertisement is nonetheless not false,
57
 An advertisement is in violation of the Act if it:
1. Contains representations that exceed prior approved representations and com-
parisons related to safety, effectiveness, or breadth of usage;
2. Makes individual drug comparisons in any particular, representing greater safety
and effectiveness for the sponsor's drug, without substantial supporting evidence or
clinical experience;
3. Contains outdated favorable opinions or information, or references or quotations
that are unduly favorable on the basis of available information and experience;
4. Provides a false sense of safety by selective presentation of quotations and
references that exclude balancing considerations;
S. Misrepresents a study report to make it appear to be a larger and more general
survey than it was;
6. Misrepresents effectiveness by non-disclosure of concomitant therapy or test con-
ditions that indicate merely a placebo effect in human trials;
7. Uses pharmacological findings in animals or in vitro studies and suggests their
clinical pertinency;
8. Fails to update authoritative opinions by eminent scientists;
9. Quotes or paraphrases out of context so as to mislead;
10. Uses irrelevant quotations or references;
II. Uses literature, quotations or references for the purpose of recommending usage
not included in approved labeling;
12. Broadens the spectrum of a combination drug's use by providing componential
descriptions rather than adhering to the suggestions for use of that fixed combination;
13. Uses studies on normal subjects without disclosing same when the drug is not
intended for use on normal individuals;
14. Pools data and statistics between unequals, thereby implying larger studies than
were actually used;
15. Downgrades, omits, denies or conceals clinical differences;
16. Misrepresents by using the "pharmacological numbers game";
17. Uses data gained at other dosage levels than those indicated or approved for
the drug in order to create a favorable impression, rather than merely citing this
information in supplemental reports;
18. Uses headlines, subheadlines, pictorial or other graphic matter in a misleading
manner;
19. Involves improper extrapolation of claims or indications to other classes of
patients and disease conditions;
20. Generalizes semantically regarding side effects and contraindications rather than
disclosing specific aide effects, unless such general terms are in the approved labeling.
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imbalanced, misleading or noncompliant with section 502(n). Of
course, this language is not new. In United States v. Ninety-Five
Barrels Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar," the Supreme Court said of the
underlying purpose of section 502:
The statute is plain and direct. Its comprehensive terms con-
demn every statement, design or device which may mislead
or deceive. Deception may result from the use of statements
not technically false or which may be literally true. The aim
of the statute is to prevent that resulting from indirection
and ambiguity, as well as from statements which are false."
Section 1.105(e)(6) purports to be definite in its proscriptive
details and in equating these with certain instances of non-compliance.
Section 1.105 (e)(7), however, describes less certain determinations:
advertisements that may be false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise
misleading. Indeed, this section adds thirteen possible violations" to
the twenty definite violations enumerated in section 1.105(e) (6). Sec-
tion 1.105(1) also was amended to buttress the FDA's claim to au-
thority and supervision as to advertisements for prescription drugs
which (1) appear in published journals, magazines, other periodicals
or newspapers, and (2) are broadcast through media such as radio,
television, or telephone communication systems.
On the other hand, the labeling provisions of section 502 and the
regulations, including those requiring and describing "full disclosure,"
are deemed to apply to the following where these (a) contain drug
58 265 U.S. 438 (1924).
59 Id. at 442-43.
60 An advertisement may be in violation of $ 502 if it:
1. Is based upon favorable information gleaned from poorly fashioned studies;
2. Uses statistical connivance or artifact rather than true clinical evidence;
3. Uses a poor study design and an improper basis for statistical evaluation, thus
tailoring figures to yield the desired results;
4. Uses tables and graphs with calculated disorientation to distort and misrepresent
relationships, trends or other findings;
5. Evidences incorrect, invalid or inappropriate statistical methodology;
6. Makes pharmacological claims knowingly insufficiently proven without advising
any such qualifications;
7. Places insufficient emphasis on side effects and contraindications by repetition
and other emphasis of safety and effectiveness;
8. Obscures side effects and contraindications by printing and space techniques;
9. Fails to achieve continuity of advertisement to encourage complete readership
when a following page carries the cautionary information;
10. Is meant for a selective class of patients, yet fails to emphasize adequately their
dosage range and likely side effects;
11. Fails to state side effects and contraindications with equal prominence on both
pages of a two-page spread;
12. In multiple page ads, fails to make prominent reference to those pages containing
information on side effects and contraindications;
13. Represents as genuine, information from false or misleading reports.
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information, (b) are supplied by the manufacturer, packer, or dis-
tributor of the drug, and (c) are disseminated by or on behalf of the
foregoing:
1. Brochures, booklets, mailing pieces, product cards, file cards
and detailing pieces;
2. Bulletins, calendars, price lists, catalogues;
3. House organs, letters;
4. Motion picture films, film strips, lantern slides;
5. Exhibits, literature and reprints;
6. Sound recordings;
7. Pieces of printed, audio or visual matter descriptive of a drug;
8. Published references (for example, the "Physicians Desk Ref-
erence") and physician, nurse and pharmacist product manuals.
Although the amendments themselves were indeed necessary, the
problem remains that neither the FDA nor the FTC has enough
qualified staff members to carry out the intent of the statute. The
agencies will be able to coerce the industry to achieve good advertising
and labeling only when they possess adequate staffing, internal and
external education and training, and appropriate enforcement tech-
niques. A staff that has the time and resources to call in the repre-
sentatives of the sponsor and the advertising agency and explain to
them why the advertising copy is unacceptable, the graphics potentially
false or misleading, the brief summary inadequate or the format
undesirable, will rarely need the enforcement weapons of seizure or
criminal prosecution. As word of the agency's vigilance and determina-
tion spreads, improved ads will probably follow.
B. Regulation of Drug Names
1. Promotion of Trade Names
Regulation of prescription drug advertising begins with regulation
of the names used in the promotion or description of a drug. A drug
may be known by three different names. Its chemical name is a tech-
nical term which simply lists every part of a drug's molecular struc-
ture.° Its generic or nonproprietary name abbreviates the list of
components but still informs a doctor of the drug's chemical composi-
tion, from which he can determine its general effect on the body.°
Ordinarily a drug will have only one nonproprietary name. 68
 Finally,
a drug may be known by a trade or brand name which identifies the
61 Weitzman, Drug, Device, Cosmetic?, 24 Food Drug Cosm. L.'. 226 (1969).
62 Id. at 248.
63
 A drug may be given more than one generic name, S. Rep. No. 448, 87 Cong.,
1st Sess. 223 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Sen. Rep. No. 448]; Kefauver Hearings, supra
note 37, at 566-68.
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drug as a product of a particular manufacturer, but conveys no in-
formation concerning its nature or composition." Several manufac-
turers often market the same chemical substance under different
proprietary names" which may be trademarked" "as if it were the
discovery of each distributor.""
According to Senator Kefauver, the purpose of the vast sums
spent by the drug industry on promotion was to persuade doctors to
prescribe medications by trade name rather than by generic name."
Since the same product sold by trade name may cost several times as
much as when sold by generic name," advertising which planted the
brand name firmly in the prescribing doctor's mind left the ultimate
consumers "captives of the drug industry.'"° This promotional effort
largely succeeded and, as a result, druggists rarely received prescrip-
tions for a drug under its generic name. 71 Several factors have been
suggested to explain the success of this promotional campaign. The
generic name was often omitted in drug advertising and labeling."
The trade name was easier to pronounce, spell, and, therefore, to
remember, especially since the drug company might intentionally
choose awkward generic names." In addition, detail men hinted that
drugs produced by smaller companies and sold by generic names were
of substandard quality."
2. Prescription by Generic Names
To encourage physicians to prescribe drugs by their generic
names, Senator Kefauver proposed in S. 1552 that all advertising
display a drug's nonproprietary name; that the government be em-
powered to establish new generic names and revise current ones on
the basis of usefulness and simplicity; and that the FDA license all
drug manufacturers, requiring them to meet strict quality control
standards and open their plants to government inspection."
In opposing the Kefauver proposal, the drug industry contended
that only by the unhampered use of trademarks "can a reputable firm
04 Kefauver Hearings, supra note 37, at 327-28.
05
 E.g., Miltown and Equanil are trade names for meprobamate, which Is the generic
name for 2-methyl-2n-propyl-I, 3-propane-ctiol dicarbamate. See M. Mintz, supra note
25, at 340 n.l.
66
 Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1082, 1116, n.269 (1963).
67
 May, Selling Drugs by "Educating" Physicians, 36 J. Med. Educ. 1, 4 (1961).
68
 See generally S. Rep. No. 448 at 105, 231-44; 107 Cong. Rec. 5638 (1961).
Kefauver Hearings, supra note 37, at 5.
70 Id.
71
 See R. Harris, supra note 23, at 30; M. Mintz, supra note 25, at 340.
72
 S. Rep. No. 448 at 231-34; 108 Cong. Rec. 16307 (1962).
78 Id. at 233; R. Harris, supra note 23, at 126.
74
 Kefauver Hearings, supra note 37, at 5.
75 S. 1552, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a) (7), (13) (1961).
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identify itself with its own quality products behind which stand the
reputation, the careful manufacturing procedures and quality controls,
and the sense of responsibility of the firm1" 7° The trademark provides
the best assurance that the patient will receive exactly what the physi-
cian prescribed since equality of experience, reliability, and integrity
among all companies cannot be legislated." The Eastland-Dirksen
version of S. 1552 adopted the drug industry's concern with trade-
mark protection" and thus weakened Kefauver's envisioned statutory
scheme. It required" an official name to be shown on labels only;
did not provide guidelines for revising generic names; merely required
manufacturers to file their names and addresses; and set vague stan-
dards for inspections every two years."
As enacted, however, the 1962 Amendments adopted neither the
Kefauver nor the Eastland-Dirksen version of S. 1552. Instead, the
Amendments require that a drug's "established name" appear on each
advertisement" and on all labeling." The established name is the only
nonproprietary name other than the chemical name or formula that can
be used to designate a drug or ingredient. It is defined as the official
name designated by the FDA" under Section 508(a) 84 of the Act;
or if none, its official name as given in an official compendium;" or if
none, its common or usual name. The FDA may designate an official
name if it finds: (1) that a drug's present name is not simple or useful;
(2) that a drug has two or more official names; (3) that two or more
substantially identical drugs have different names; or (4) that a drug
has no official name." Finally, the Amendments guarantee drug quality
by imposing certain safeguards over manufacturing, including registra-
tion and inspection."
76 Connor, Functions of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Our Society, Drugs in Our
Society 129 (Talaly ed. 1964).
77
 Id. at 130.
78 108 Cong. Rec. 10108 (1962).
79 S. 1744, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3(a), 4, 9, 10 (1962).
so R. Harris, The Real Voice 165 (1964).
81 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1964). The regulations indicate, however,
that the established name need not appear if the advertisement does not contain the
drug's proprietary name. 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(b)(1) (1969).
82 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 1 352(e) (I) (1964).
82 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C.; 352(e) (2) (1964).
84 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 358(a) (1964).
85 The term "official compendium" means the United States Pharmacopoeia, the
Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia, or the National Formulary. Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(j) (1964).
86 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. * 358(c) (1964).
87 Registration: Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(p), 352(o), 360 (1964). In-
spection: Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1964). Control: Food and Drug Act, 21
U.S.C. § 351(a) (1964). See Giumarra, Drug Amendments of 1962—Generic-Name Pre-
scribing: Drug Price Panacea?, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 649, 650 n.15 (1964) ; Council on Drugs
of the American Medical Association Conference, 207 J.A.MA. 1335 (1969).
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3. Placement of Established Names
Regulations issued under the 1962 Amendments require advertise-
ments to carry the established name of any drug ingredient for which
a proprietary name is given. 88
 The established name of a drug or
ingredient must be placed in "direct" conjunction with its proprietary
name," but not, as originally proposed," in "immediate" conjunction.
The change allows manufacturers to place copyright symbols and
trademarks between the two names.°L To alert doctors to the exact
relationship between the two designations, the established name must
be surrounded by brackets or preceded' by the phrase "brand of" or a
similar term."
A drug which combines two or more active ingredients may not
have an established name. In that case, the quantitative ingredient
information which must appear in the advertisement" performs the
function of calling the doctor's attention to the chemical composition
of the drug. This information must be placed in direct conjunction
with the most prominent display of the trade name." If a combination
of active ingredients present in more than one preparation has no
established name, a list of the generic names of the active ingredients
must similarly be placed in direct conjunction with the most prominent
display of the brand name, preceded by a phrase such as "brand of."98
4. Prominence of Established Names
In addition to demanding disclosure of the generic name, Senator
Kefauver proposed that a drug's generic name be "printed in type at
least as large and as prominent as that used for any trade or brand
name. . . ."" This standard went beyond that then imposed by the
AMA on advertisements in its scientific publications:
The full generic name . . . of each active ingredient must be
shown in appropriate type size. If the generic name of a drug
appears in close juxtaposition to the trade name, it should not
be unduly subordinated and under no circumstances appear
in less than 10 point type'
88 21 C.F.R. 11.105 (b) (1) (1969).
80 Id.
90 28 Fed. Reg. 1448-449 (1963).
01 Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962, 38 N.Y.U. L, Rev. 1082, 1118 (1963).
02 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(b) (1) (1969).
93 See text at notes 170-81 Infra.
04 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(c) (1969).
98 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(d) (1) (1969).
00 S. 1552, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. g 4(a) (4), (a) (7) (1961). Drug advertisements which
did carry the generic name sometimes printed it in type so small that it could be read only
with a magnifying glass. 108 Cong. Rec. 17369 (1962) (remarks of Senator Kefauver),
07
 Advertising in the AMA Scientific Publications, 172 J.A.MA. 453 (1960).
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The Eastland-Dirksen version of S. 1552, as reported out by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, required only that the drug's official name on
the label be printed to comply with Section 502(c) of the 1938 Act,"
which directs that statements on labels and labeling be "prominently
placed thereon with such conspicuousness . . . and in such terms as to
render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual
under customary conditions of purchase and use."" Dissatisfied with
the committee report, President Kennedy suggested adoption of Section
112 of the Administration's House drug bill"° which contained the
present standards for type size and prominence.'" It also included a
requirement, which was never passed in either the House or the Senate,
that the generic name on the label be given "precedence in position.'""
The statute, in its final form, requires that the established name
be at least one-half as large as the trade name. However, the use of
bolder or thicker type, or of a different color or background for the
trade name might obscure the generic name. To insure that the generic
name will not go unnoticed even in a quick reading of an ad, the regula-
tions prescribe that the established name shall "have a prominence
commensurate with the prominence with which such proprietary name
or designation appears. . . In deciding whether this subjective test
has been met, the advertiser or FDA reviewer must consider "all per-
tinent factors, including typography, layout, contrast, and other print-
ing features."' For combination drugs lacking a generic name, the
prominence of the substitute quantitative ingredient information "shall
bear a reasonable relationship to the prominence of the proprietary
name."'" A similar test applies for the prominence of the list of active
ingredients required for drugs which combine active ingredients present
in more than one combination and which lack established names.'"
5. The Every-Time Controversy
In early 1963, the Food and Drug Administration issued regula-
tions requiring that the established name of a prescription drug accom-
pany every appearance of the drug's trade name on all labeling 107 and
advertising108 no matter how many times the brand name is repeated
98 S. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1962).
95 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(c) (1964).
100 H.R. 11581, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1962).
101 See text at notes 81-82 supra.
102 H.R. 11581, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1962).
193 21 C.F.R. 1.105(b)(2) (1969).
104 Giumarra, supra note 87, at 659-60 Incorrectly states that.this' regulation does
not exist.
109 . 21 CF.R. § 1.105(c) (1969).
159 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(d) (1) (1969). 
107. 21 C.F.R. 1.104(g) (1) (1969).
Los 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(b) (1) (1969)—
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on any single page. The FDA contends that the "every-time" regula-
tions are crucial to the 1962 Amendments since they carry out the
"evident intent" of Congress to popularize established names.'" Argu-
ing that the Statute dictates only the manner in which the generic
name must appear, and not its frequency,"° the Pharmaceutical Manu-
facturers Association (P.M.A.)m and 37 of its members sought a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for Delaware
invalidating the regulations as exceeding the FDA's statutory authority.
This suit marked the first legal challenge to FDA regulations since
the 1938 Act. 112 The drug industry's concern extended beyond the
estimated million-dollar cost' of reprinting its existing labels to
comply with the every-time requirement. The regulations struck at
the purpose of drug promotion—the implantation of trade names in
the doctor's mind.'" They sought to lower drug prices by educating
physicians to prescribe by generic names. The industry feared, however,
that increased familiarity with nonproprietary names would endanger
its investment in brand names and in research for new and better
products," little of which is undertaken by smaller, generic-name
producers.' Conspicuous disclosure of the generic name, to which the
industry did not object, would apprise the physician of the drug's
active ingredients. He could then choose among the various sources
which produce the same or comparable chemical substances at different
prices. Constant repetition of the established name, on the other hand,
would make advertising and labeling less readable, to the detriment
of patients who would be served by new drugs. Finally, the industry
complained that the regulations would induce doctors to believe that
drugs with the same established name are always and in all respects
identical, when in fact, drugs with the same generic name but different
proprietary names can and do differ in their therapeutic effect.
The plaintiffs attacked the regulations by focusing on the statutory
too Motion for Summary Judgment at 31, Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp.
855 (D. Del. 1964).
110 Brief for Appellees at 40, 42, Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286 (3rd Cir.
1965).
111 The P.M.A. is a trade association of approximately 140 manufacturers of pre-
scription drugs.
112 The legislative counsel for the P.M.A stated that the two suits against the FDA
are not part of a continuing FDA-industry war, nor do they show any animosity toward
government regulation. Instead, the suits challenge regulations which the industry feels
exceed the scope of the FDA's statutory authority. Kelly, Three Years Later, 21 Food
Drug Cosm. L.J. 21, 23-24 (1966).
113 Worley, Problems of Compliance With the Drug Amendments of 1962, 19 Bus.
Law. 218-19 (1963).
114 5. Rep. No. 448 at 105, 231-44 (1961).
115 Business Week, Sept. 14, 1963, at 60.
110 Buatti, An Appraisal of Progress in Drug Marketing, 21 Food - Drug Cosm. L.J.
33, 36-37 (1966).
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language and on the torturedm legislative history of the 1962 Amend-
ments. Section 502(n) requires that all advertisements include "a true
statement of . . . the established name . . . printed prominently and
in type at least half as large as that used for any trade or brand name
thereof . . . .""8
 The language of section 502 (e), 118 which applies to
labels and labeling, is similar. Use of the word "any," however, makes
the provision ambiguous. Plaintiffs urged that if the proprietary name
is mentioned four times on a piece of promotional material, the type
size of the established name "must be half as large as that used for
'any' mention of the proprietary name.'" 2° In this event, the type size
would have to be half as large as the largest type used in mentioning
the proprietary name. Even if "any" were read as "all," the statute
would demand only that "the established name's type size must be
half as large as that used for all four mentions of the proprietary
name."121
 "Any" would also "cover the case where two or more differ-
ent proprietary names appear in a single promotional piece." 122
Furthermore, plaintiffs suggested that if Congress had intended
the every-time requirement, the "prominently" requirement in the
statute is superfluous.123
 To the FDA's argument that "prominently"
would still have content by preventing the established name from being
printed in type "as small as 4 point,'"" the drug companies responded
that the statutory command that the established name appear in type
half as large as the trade name "effectively eliminates this possibility,
for no manufacturer will out of self-interest underplay the brand name
of his product.'"28
The Food and Drug Administration stressed two items in the
legislative history of section 502 (e). The Senate Judiciary Committee
Report on S. 1552 128
 states that section 502(e) "would .. • require
that on labels and on any labeling, wherever a trade or brand name
is used, the established name . . . must be shown in type at least one-
half as large as that used for the trade or brand name.'" Plaintiffs
117
 "Those in the future who attempt to study the legislative history of this measure
as it passed through its various stages may be forgiven if they become somewhat con-
fused." 108 Cong. Rec. 22037 (1962) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
118 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. $ 352(n) (1964).
112
 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. $ 352(e) (1964).
120 Brief for Appellees, supra note 110, at 30.
121
 Brief for Plaintiffs at 16, Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855, 856.
122 Brief for Appellees, supra note 110, at 30.
123
 Brief for Appellees, supra note 110, at 30-31. This argument was successful in
the district court. Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855, 864 (D. Del. 1964).
124
 Brief for Appellants at 45, Abbot Labs. v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286 (3d Cir.
1965).
125 Brief for Appellees, supra note 110, at 31 n.30.
120
 S. Rep. No. 1744, pt. 2, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
127
 Id. at 8.
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countered that "wherever" does not mean "every time;" rather, it
means "if."'" They said that this reading finds support in a statement
made by Senator Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee:
"On the label, and on any labeling on which the drug . . . is named,
if a trade name is used for the drug . . . , the established name of the
drug • . must be shown in type at least half the size of the type used
for the trade name."'" The interpretation of the word "wherever" was
important because that word was admittedly the only indication in the
Senate report that Congress intended an every-time requirement.'"
Second, the FDA pointed to the rejection of the "O'Brien Amend-
ment." During debate on the Harris bill, 181 the House unanimously
adopted an amendment offered by Representative O'Brien, providing
that in the case of labeling, the established name must be printed prom-
inently and in half-size type "at the first place, and at the most con-
spicuous place if other than the first place, at which such proprietary
name for such drug ... is used. . .."" 2 A House conference eliminated
this provision,'" which Senator Kefauver viewed as a limitation upon
the frequency with which the established name should appear.
This limitation was not accepted by the conferees. Thus the
established name of a prescription drug must appear in type
at least half as large as the trade name wherever the latter is
used in drug promotional matter, including package inserts,
and so forth.'"
Disregarding Senator Kefauver's statement as self-serving, the plain-
tiffs argued that the rejection of the O'Brien Amendment did not
make the every-time 'requirement imperative. Rather, the rejection
"could mean, at most, that the one or two mentions of the established
name specified in the O'Brien Amendment were not necessarily suf-
ficient. . . ." 1"
In oral argument, drug industry counsel suggested that the
O'Brien Amendment strengthened the previous (and final) statutory
provision. Counsel conceded that defining "prominence" was within
128 Brief for Appellees, supra note 110, at 34-35.
120 108 Cong. Rec. 17366-7367 (1962) (remarks of Senator Eastland).
130 The following colloquy occurred during oral argument before the district court:
"The Court: Is there anything in the report where it says, 'we intend that
every time the brand name is used the generic or established name shall follow'?
"Mr. Goodrich, counsel for defendants: Only the word 'wherever'."
Joint Appendix at 25a, Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965).
181 H.R. 11581, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
182 108 Cong. Rec. 21081 (1962).
288 H.R. Rep. No. 2526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1962).
184 108 Cong. Rec. 22039 (1962) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
185 Brief for Appellees, supra note 110, at 36-37.
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the FDA's authority,'" and that the generic name should perhaps
appear once per page on multi-page matter, and at the title of a pub-
lication if the trade name were used there. 1" But constant repetition
of the generic name, besides detracting from the individuality of drug
products, would be unnecessary and confusing, and would tend to
discourage doctors from reading advertisements.'" Finally, plaintiffs
convinced the district court judge that their interpretation of the
elimination of the O'Brien Amendment was correct. Invalidating the
regulations, the court said:
First, it is not clear that Kefauver's characterization of
the O'Brien amendment as a limitation is accurate. Second
Kefauver's term "wherever" is not free from ambiguity. It
could mean that the generic name must appear each time the
trade name is mentioned. On the other hand, it could mean
that the generic name must appear on a label or brochure or
medicine box wherever the trade name is used. Apparently
Kefauver favored the every time requirement. But nowhere
in the legislative history is there evidence to show that other
members of the Congress favored the every-time requirement
or that they were aware that "prominently" should have a
special meaning.
The views of Senator Kefauver, in this instance, cannot
override what the court believes is the general Congressional
intent. This is especially true since the expression of those
views are circumscribed and open to doubt.
If Congress had meant that the generic name should ap-
pear with every mention of the trade name, it could have said
so. It has not. It has said only that the generic name must
appear prominently. The statute will not bear the interpreta-
tion which the defendants have put upon it.'"
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on procedural
grounds, holding that there was no "actual case or controversy" as
130 See Joint Appendix, supra note 130, at 31a.
137
 Id. at 41a. The drug industry has also suggested twice per page (at the top and
bottom). Note, Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 Rutgers L. Rev.
101, 126 (1963).
238 Counsel for plaintiffs compared the constant repetition of generic names in ad-
vertising to listing all of the parties whenever the terms "plaintiffs" or "defendants" are
used in a brief, "so you (the court) are sure you know what I am talking about."
"The Court: I might not have read your brief."
"Mr. Gesell (counsel for plaintiffs): I think you might not. And I think the doctor
may not read that (advertising)."
Joint Appendix, supra note 130, at 32a.
130 See Joint Appendix, supra note 130, at 34a.
140 Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855, 864 (D. Del. 1964).
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required for justiciability under the Declaratory Judgment Act because
no real threat of immediate prosecution had been presented."' The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals finding
that "the impact of the regulations . . . is sufficiently direct and imme-
diate so as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review at this
stage,"142 and remanded the case to the court of appeals for a decision
on the substantive issues.
On the day set for further argument in the Third Circuit, the FDA
and the drug manufacturers announced settlement of the litigation.
The FDA agreed to replace the contested every-time rules with new
regulations. On any page of advertising or labeling which "features"
a drug's trade name, the generic name must appear "in direct conjunc-
tion with" and in type half as large as the brand name each time the
latter is featured, but need not appear again in promotional copy on
the same page. If a trade name is used but not "featured," the generic
name must appear at least once with the most prominent display of the
trade name. In addition, each column of text providing detailed in-
formation on effectiveness or side effects must include the generic name
at least once "in association with" the trade name, if used, in the same
size type as that used for the text. If the trade name appears in a
type size larger than that used for the column text, the generic name
must again be half as large as the trade name.'"
In light of recent congressional hearings regarding prescription
by generic name,'" however, the FDA need not insist vigorously on
educating doctors to use generic name drugs, so long as the generic
name is prominently disclosed in drug advertising. In fact, a survey of
ads in the journals shows that, contrary to FDA regulations, the generic
name type face does not always appear half as bold or half as wide as
that used for the trade name. In many cases, the generic name is not
preceded by a phrase such as "brand of" nor surrounded by brackets
or parenthesis. While the new rules may lead to new controversies
over their exact interpretation, they appear to be a reasonable com-
promise. Commentators have split on the question of whether the now
withdrawn every-time regulations were consonant with the Congres-
sional purpose.'" Ambiguity in the statutory provision on generic
names and in its legislative history probably indicate that Congress
had no intent on the question of frequency. The AMA, which generally
supports the industry against the FDA, urges doctors to prescribe by
141
 Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286 (3rd Cir. 1965).
142 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
148 21 C.F.R. 1.105 (1969). See also 33 Fed. Reg. 3217-218 (1968).
144 Hearings on Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Before the Monopoly
Subcomm. of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
145 Sweeney, The Generic Every Time Case: Prescription Drug Industry in Ex-
tremis, 21 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 226 (1966).
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trade name,'" but to use generic names in teaching or communicating
with other physicians; or where prescribing by generic name, to pro-
vide the name of a reliable manufacturer whose product could fill the
prescription. Since the stated purpose of this practice is to insure the
quality and potency of the prescribed drug, the AMA evidently does
not think that the 1962 Amendments are fully effective. In light of this
opposition, should the FDA insist on attempting to educate doctors
to use generic name drugs and to think of drugs with the same generic
name as equivalent, or should the FDA merely insure that the estab-
lished name is prominently disclosed, leaving the medical schools to
carry the burden of teaching doctors to use generic names? Contrary
to industry contentions, advertisements which now comply with the
every-time requirement are readable and attractive. In fact, if these
companies have not noted any dilution of their trademarks, perhaps
the scales should tip in favor of the FDA.
6. Additional Requirements
Since the regulations do not require that the established names of
the ingredients of a drug lacking a generic name be printed in type
half as large as that used for the drug's trade name, the names of
ingredients often appear in small type. Since an ingredient (such as the
ingredient estrogen in birth control pills) may have considerable side
effects and contraindications, the FDA should enforce its regulations
requiring that the prominence of the quantitative ingredient informa-
tion or the generic names of active ingredients bear "a reasonable
relationship to the prominence of the proprietary name.""T
If no established name exists for an active ingredient of a new
drug, the New Drug Application must propose a nonproprietary name"
so that one may be adopted before the drug becomes available com-
mercially. The FDA requires that the name not conflict with other
nonproprietary names or trademarks; 1" that it be simple and useful,
and not misleading or confusing; and that it show the relationship
between the drug and chemically and pharmacologically related drugs.
The AMA, FDA, United States Pharmacopeia, and the National For-
mulary assist manufacturers in selecting a nonproprietary name,'"
which becomes the drug's established name when accepted by an official
compendium, under FDA order, or by common usage."' These four
149 See generally Council on Drugs of the American Medical Association Conference,
207 J.A.M.A. 1335 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Council on Drugs].
147 2! C.F.R. § 1,105(c), (d)(1) (1969).
14$ 21 C.F.R. § 130.4(c), Form FD-356 § 6(d) (1969).
140 CCU F. D. Cosm. L. Rep. 1I 80,020 (1963).
160 Id. at 1 80,011.
151 Id at 80,020; see Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1964).
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organizations submit names for new antibiotics to the World Health
Organization, the British Pharmacopeia Commission, the French
Codex Commission, and the Nordic Pharmacopoeia Council.'" The
FDA has stated that it hopes to issue only a minimum number of
regulations establishing generic names. 153
If a drug or ingredient is a common substance the limitations of
which would be readily recognized under the drug's established name,
prescription drug advertisements may not employ a "fanciful" trade
name for the drug or ingredient in a manner that implies some unique
effectiveness."' Nor may an advertisement designate a drug or ingre-
dient by a trade name which, because of similarity in spelling or
pronunciation, may be confused with the trade or established name
of a different drug or ingredient . 1"
7. Current Proposals
FDA supervision of drug safety and consumer deception has be-
come so comprehensive that there remain very few areas where it can
be increased without completely subjecting the industry to adminis-
trative fiat. However, an example of a proposal which would give
them even more power was adverted to by the Task Force on Prescrip-
tion Drugs in its Second Interim Report. The Task Force recom-
mended, among other things, that the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare call one or more conferences to consider "development
of a registration and licensing system under which no drug product
would be permitted in interstate commerce unless produced under
quality control standards set by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare."'"
Former Secretary Cohen, in testifying at the FTC's hearings on
consumer protection in November, 1968, advocated that producers of
over-the-counter drugs be required to submit records and reports of
product performance to the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. He also supported requirements that drugs in tablet or
capsule form bear numbers identifying the drug and its manufacturer,
and that the label of a prescription drug bear the generic name of the
drug and the name of the manufacturer. Whether the FTC or Secre-
tary Richardson will support the proposal is in doubt. Mr. Cohen's
proposal, in regard to prescription drug labels, went a bit further than
152
 Council on Drugs, supra note 146, at 1352.
153
 CCH F. D. Cosm. L. Rep. 80,020 at 80,092.
134 21 C.F.R. 1.105(a) (3) (1969).
155 21 C.F.R. 1.105(a) (5) (1969).
156
 Task Force on Prescription Drugs, Report and Recommendations, Subcomm. on
Monopoly, Senate Select Small Bus. Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1940 (1988).
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that of the Task Force on Prescription Drugs which had recommended
that:
The Congress should enact legislation requiring that the con-
tainers of all dispensed prescription drugs be labeled with the
identity, strength and quantity of the product, except where
this is waived upon specific orders of the prescriber.'"
Indeed, in a recent session of Congress a bill to this effect was
introduced.'" In commenting on the Task Force Report, the P. M. A.
endorsed this proposal and suggested that it be broadened to require
the label of dispensed prescription drugs to bear not only the name by
which the drug was prescribed, but also the name of the manufacturer
or distributor and the lot and control numbers. 189 The argument in
favor of identifying a prescription drug on the label is based on
safety: a user of prescription drugs, should he require medical treat-
ment from a physician other than the prescriber, should be able to
inform him accurately and without delay of the nature of the medica-
tion he is taking.
It is in the area of drug economics, however, that most of the
legislative fireworks will occur in future sessions of Congress. Senator
Kefauver, almost 12 years ago, called for an assault on what he termed
the high price of drugs. For example, according to the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the cost of prescription drugs for the last
five years has risen approximately 15 percent. Today, the political
appeal of attacking the high prices paid for drugs by the consumer is
enhanced by the ever-increasing involvement of government, at all
levels, in progressively more expensive medical programs.
Drug patents and trademarks were the target of several witnesses
before Senator Nelson's Monopoly Sub-Committee in 1969. 1" These
witnesses contended that the restriction or even elimination of these
industrial properties would encourage price competition. However, no
legislation in this area is likely until completion of the study called for
by the Task Force on Prescription Drugs. Whether the study will
include presentations by non-governmental organizations is not clear.
However, it is indeed ominous that the Task Force recommended con-
ferences with representatives of the drug industry, pharmacy, clinical
medicine and consumer groups to consider the proposal of federally
107 Id. at 42.
158 S. 3290, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
158 Critique of the Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Prescription
Drugs 57.
100 For example, Testimony of Dr. Leonard G. Scheflin, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Monopoly, Senate Select Comm. on Small Bus., 90th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.,
pt. 5, at 1862 et seq; Testimony of Dr. Henry Steele, Id. at 1901 et seq.
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mandated quality control standards, but called only for a study by
federal agencies of the revision of patent and trademark law.
In the First • Session of the 90th Congress, a Senate-House con-
ference deleted from the Social Security amendment a bill which would
have established a United States formulary of generically identified
drugs,"" together with price ranges for such drugs. The price ranges
set out would determine federal payments for drugs dispensed under
Medicare and state Medicaid programs. The conference did adopt a
substitute clause calling for a study by the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare of the quality and cost standards of drugs for which
payments are made under the Social Security Ace" Shortly before
the conference's action, a proposal to add prescription drugs to the
benefits available under the voluntary coverage provisions of Medicare
Plan B had been defeated in committee."' That bill also contained
provisions for a drug formulary with price information. Senator Nelson,
still embroiled in his hearings, introduced a bill to amend the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act to provide for a federal drug compendium
of prescription drugs by their generic names.'" This compendium
would include price information.
C. Quantitative Ingredient Information
Every prescription drug advertisement must contain "a true state-
ment of . . . the formula showing quantitatively each ingredient of
such drug to the extent required for labels under Sec. 502 (e). . . ."'"
The regulations likewise require that "the information presented in the
advertisement concerning the quantity of each such ingredient shall
be the same as the corresponding information on the label of the
product."'" The term "ingredient" applies to any substance in the
drug, whether added to the formulation as a single substance or in a
mixture with other substances.'" Although section 502 (n) 108 refers
to "each ingredient," the cross-references to 502 (e)"' evidently indi-
cate that the quantity must be given for each active ingredient, and
the quantity or proportion of certain named ingredients (whether
active or not), but not for other ingredients. But the advertisement may
not feature inert or inactive ingredients "in a manner that creates an
101 II,R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
10 S. Amend. 142, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
168 5. Rep. 17, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1967).
104 5, Rep. 2944, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The Senator has reintroduced this
legislation, S. 950, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
1" Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 0 352 (n) (1964).
166 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(a) (2) (1969).
107 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(b) (1969).
lab Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 4 352(n) (1964).
100 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1964).
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impression of value greater than their true functional role in the
formulation."'"
The required statement of quantity should be given per dosage
unit if the drug is in tablet, capsule, or other dosage form. If not, the
amount of the ingredient must be expressed in a specified unit of weight
or measure of the drug, or the percentage of such ingredient in the
drug.' In both cases, the statement of quantity must be made in
terms informative to doctors.'" The order of listing or the relative
prominence otherwise given the ingredient names in the ad may not
be misleading.'" All of the required ingredient information must
appear together, without any intervening printed matter, except for
the proprietary names of ingredients, which may be included with the
listing of established names.'" In addition, the quantitative ingredient
information must appear "in direct conjunction" with the display of
the name of at least one specific dosage form, which in turn must
appear "prominently."'" If other dosage forms are listed, the quanti-
tative ingredient information for such dosage forms "shall appear in
direct conjunction and in equal prominence with the most prominent
listing of the names of such dosage forms.'"
PART II. PRESCRIPTION DRUG LABELING
Regulations governing prescription drug labeling are scattered
among the several subsections of Section 501 of the Food and Drug
Act.'" They range from a broad ban against false and misleading label-
ing'" to the rule that decimal fractions expressing the quantity of a drug
shall not be carried out to more than three places.'" The most com-
prehensive list of labeling regulations issued to date exempts's° pre-
scription drugs from the requirement that labeling include adequate
directions for use."' In effect, however, the "exemption" defines either
directly or by cross-reference much of the information that must be
disclosed for all prescription drugs, except those for which adequate
use directions are commonly known.'" These "full disclosure" regula-
170 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(a) (4) (1969).
171 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(d) (1969). The required percentage is specified in the regu-
lations.
172 Id.
178 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.105(a)(2), 1.104(c)(1) (1969).
174 21 C.F.R § 1.105(a) (1) (1969),
175 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(d) (2) (1969).
178 Id.
177 52 Stat. 1050 (1938), as amended 76 Stat. 790-92 (1962), 21 U.S.C. 1352 (1964).
178 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 0 352(a) (1964).
170 21 C.F.R.
	 1.102(g) (1969).
180 21 CYR § 1.106(b) (1969).
181 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 352(f) (1964).
182 21 C.F.R. 1.106(b) (3) (ii), (h) (1969).
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tions require that certain information appear on the label, which is
defined as any written matter carried on the drug's immediate con-
tainer, or on other labeling.'" Furthermore, labeling on or within the
drug's package must recite all of the information, including side effects
and contraindications, which appears in all promotional labeling. Any
information required to appear on the label must also appear on the
outside container or wrapper of the retail package or be easily legible
through it.'"
A. Regulation of Names
The FDA exercises control over drug names used in labeling much
the same as it does over those used in advertising. Any labeling on
which a trade name appears must include the corresponding established
name for the drug.'" The established name must be placed in direct
conjunction with the proprietary name, either surrounded by brackets
or preceded by a phrase such as "brand of."'" It must be printed in
letters at least half as large as those used for the brand name, and
must have a prominence commensurate with the prominence of the
trade name, "taking into account all pertinent factors, including typog-
raphy, layout, contrast, and other printing features." 187
 The every-time
requirement for labeling 188 was suspended during the previously men-
tioned litigation. If an established name does not reveal that an ingre-
dient is a derivative of certain parent substances specifically named in
the Act, the labeling must do so.'" Where a combination drug lacks
an established name, the required quantitative ingredient information
must "be placed in direct conjunction with the most prominent display
of the proprietary name," and its prominence "shall bear a reasonable
relationship to the prominence of the proprietary name."'"
B. Quantitative Ingredient Information
The labels of prescription drugs must bear a statement of the
quantity of all active ingredients and certain listed ingredients whether
active or not."' This information must be expressed per dosage unit
if the drug is sold in dosage-unit form or, if not, per specified unit of
183 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 321(k) (1964).
184 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § .321(1) (1964).
185 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1964).
180 21 C,F.R. § 1.104(g) (1) (1969).
187 21	 § 1.104(g) (2) (1969).
188 21 C.F.R. # 1.104(g) (1) (1969).
1811 21 C.F.R. § 1,104(f) (1969). A derivative of a substance named in Food and
Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e), is an article derived or prepared from such substance
by any method, including actual or theoretical chemical action. 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(e)
(1969).
188 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(h) (1) (1969).
lin Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1964).
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weight or measure, or in terms of the percentage of such ingredient in
the drug.1" If the drug is not for oral use, its labeling must list the names
of all inactive ingredients,1" with certain exceptions. If the drug is
for human consumption and contains any quantity of named habit-
forming substances or their derivatives designated as habit-forming,
its labeling must bear the name and quantity of such substances, "and
in juxtaposition," the statement: "Warning—May be habit forming."'"
Under the Act, a drug's labeling is considered misleading if it fails to
reveal the true proportion of an ingredient or some other fact regarding
it, when such failure is material in light of the naming of the ingre-
dient.'" For example, labeling need not prominently list a powerful
ingredient present in the drug in an amount so small as to have little
effect, unless it states its quantity.19°
C. Placement of Information
All required ingredient information must appear "together" on the
label without any intervening printed matter except (1) ingredient
trade names, which may accompany the listing of established names,
and (2) cautions such as "Warning—May be habit forming," as re-
quired by the Act.'° 7
 If the drug's container is too small to bear the
quantitative ingredient information on the main display panel, it may
appear elsewhere on the label, so long as its size and prominence are
"reasonably related" to the size and prominence of the front-panel
display.1" If the drug's container is too small to bear anywhere the
nonproprietary names and quantities of ingredients, the label must
state only the proprietary name of the drug, its established name, if
any, an identifying lot or control number, and the name of the manu-
facturer, packer, or distributor. In addition, all other information
required must appear on the carton or other outer container, or in the
package inseam
D. Misleading Labeling
Under the general ban against false and misleading labeling, and
under section 502 (e), certain practices, including artful "word-smith-
192 21 C.F.R.	 1.104(d) (1969).
103 21 C.F.R.	 1.106(b) (2)(v) (1969).
1a4 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(d) (1964).
195
 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(c) (2) (1969). See also Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 201(n)
(1964). In addition, labeling is misleading if it features inert or inactive ingredients in a
manner that creates an impression of value greater than their true functional role in the
formulation. 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(c) (4) (1969).
199 Willig, Some Present Responsibilities in Labeling and Advertising, 24 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 578, 582 (1969).
191 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (1969).
199 21 C.F.R. 1.104(h)(2) (1969).
199 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(1) (1969).
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ing,'"" have been forbidden. Thus, labeling may be misleading (1) if
the drug's name includes or suggests the name of one or more, but not
all of its ingredients, even though the names of all such ingredients are
listed elsewhere in the labeling; 201 (2) if it employs a "fanciful" brand
name for the drug or its ingredients implying some unique effectiveness
or composition, when the drug or ingredient is merely a common
substance, the limitations of which are readily recognized under the
established name or names; 292 (3) if the trade name of the drug or an
ingredient may be confused with the trade or established name of a
different drug or ingredient, because of similarity in spelling or pro-
nunciation; 2" or (4) by reason of the order of listing or prominence
otherwise given the ingredient names in the labeling. 204
E. Other Required Information
The "full disclosure" regulations also require that the label carry
an identifying lot or control number, 2" the recommended or usual
dosage,2" the route of administration if the drug is not for oral use, 207
and the statement, "Caution: Federal law prohibits dispensing without
prescription."2" However, the drug's container may be too small or
otherwise unable to accommodate a label with sufficient space to bear
this information in addition to the required name and quantitative
ingredient information. In that case, the lot number may appear on the
crimp of the drug's dispensing tube; the caution may appear on the
drug's outer container only; and the dosage, administration route, and
names of all inactive ingredients of drugs not for oral use may be
contained in other labeling such as the package insert."'
The label of a drug in package form must also contain the name
and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor, and
.an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight,
measure, or numerical count, as these terms are defined in regula-
tions.21° However, a drug is exempt from the latter requirementm if
the statement of quantity—together with all other information required
to appear on the label by the Act—cannot be so placed on the label
200 CCH F. D. Cosm. L. Rep. 1; 40,015.
201. 21 C.F.R. § 1.101(b) (1969).
"2 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(3) (1969).
203 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(c) (5) (1969).
204 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(c) (1) (1969).
208 21 C.F.R. § 1.106 (b)(vi) (1969).
200 21 C.F.R. 1.106(b) (2) (ii) (1969).
207 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b)(2)(iii) (1969).
208 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b) (2) (i) (1969).
200 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b) (2) (1969).
210 21 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (1969).
211 21 C.F.R.	 1.102(m) (1969).
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as to comply with the prominence standards of Section 502(c). 212
Certain other small packages are also exempt. Section 502 (c) provides
that any required word, statement, or other information must appear
on the label or labeling prominently and "with such conspicuousness (as
compared with other words, statements, designs, or devices in the
labeling) and in such terms as to render it likely to be read and
understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions
of purchase and use." 218
F. Package Inserts and Promotional Labeling
In general, full disclosure labeling in the form of a package insert
must accompany the marketed or dispensing package of all prescrip-
tion drugs. 214 The insert supplies full information—not a summary—
for the use of the drug by doctors. This information includes indica-
tions, side effects, dosages, routes of administration, frequency and
duration of administration, contraindications, and other relevant warn-
ing information. Side effects must be given for all uses for which the
drug is advertised or represented. For drugs subject to the new drug
or certification requirements of the Act, the package insert must bear
the labeling approved by the FDA.2" This is the only case where the
insert is subject to government pre-clearance. No package insert is
necessary if the drug's hazards, warning, and use information are com-
monly known to physicians 21°
Promotional labeling other than strict reminder-pieces must con-
tain similar information, including full disclosure of side effects. 217
If the labeling describes a new drug or antibiotic subject to certifica-
tion, it must be "substantially the same" as that approved in the New
Drug Application or certification.'" Manufacturers are given a "satis-
factory degree of latitude" in choosing phraseology and the format for
labeling which functions as advertising, but otherwise mailing pieces
must convey essentially the same information as appears in the package
insert.'" In response to criticism that physicians see promotional
labeling and advertising, but not the drug's package insert, an official
of the FDA has pointed out that the insert "at the present time .. .
212 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(c) (1964).
218 Id.
214 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(6)(3) (1969).
218 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(h) (3) (if) (1969).
218 21 C.F.R.	 1.106(b) (3) (1969).
217 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b) (4) (1969). All labeling except labels and cartons which
carry information concerning the uses of the drug must also bear the date of issuance or
the date of the latest revision of such labeling. 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b) (5) (1969).
218 21 C.F.R. § 1.106(b) (4) (i) (1969).
218 Oser, Regulatory Requirements for Misleading Labeling, 24 Food Drug COS113.
L.J. 141, 145 (1969).
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is the one form of distribution of information which can be enforced.""°
In addition, the package insert is contained in samples sent or given
to doctors and may be obtained at drug stores. The full disclosure
regulations thus enable doctors to prescribe medicines, especially
powerful new drugs which may produce serious adverse reactions,
with reasonable safety. 221
Compliance with these regulations is initially tested when a New
Drug Application is submitted to the FDA. After determining that
the drug is safe and effective under the conditions of use specified in
its labeling,"' the FDA approves the drug and notifies the manufac-
turer what warnings and contraindications must appear. New data
indicating that the drug is no longer safe and effective under conditions
expressed in the labeling provide a basis for withdrawing the New
Drug Application.'" Moreover, the FDA may withhold or withdraw
approval of the New Drug Application if the labeling is "false or
misleading in any particular;" 224 and a drug which does not conform
to the Act's labeling or advertising provisions is misbranded.'"
The manufacturer must file a supplemental New Drug Application
if any mailing or promotional piece to be used after a new drug is
marketed "deviates in any significant respect from the approved label-
ing."'" If a "material change" is made in advertising or labeling, and
the drug is marketed before a supplement is approved for it, its New
Drug Application may be withdrawn or suspended.'" However, a
recent amendment to the regulations allows a manufacturer to make
necessary additions of warning information, and deletions of "false,
misleading, or unsupported indications for use or claims for effective-
ness."'" The supplemental New Drug Application then filed must
explain the changes, and the manufacturer must submit copies of re-
vised labeling.'" If the supplemental New Drug Application is dis-
approved, labeling and advertising for the drug must be revised. In
this way, therefore, the FDA can exercise a check on even those
changes which appear urgent.
PART III. THE STANDARD OF CARE IN DRUG REACTION CASES
At a 1969 conference on drug usage, one speaker estimated that
there were at least 1,500,000 hospital admissions annually due to drug
2201 IdPisani, Drug Safety and F.D.A., 21 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 68, 72 (1966).
221 
222 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1964).
228 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S,C. § 355(e) (1964).
224 21 U.S.C. I 355(d), ( 0) ( 1964).
225 Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § .352 (1964).
220 21 C.F.R. § 130.9(a) (1969).
227
 21 C.F.R. § 130.9(c) (1969).
225 21 C.F.R. 130.9(d)-(g) (1969).
229 21 C.F.R. § 130.9(e) (1969).
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reactions 230
 Thus, concern for those patients who are exposed to com-
bination antibiotics has a firm base indeed. An adverse reaction pro-
duced by a drug is any effect which is neither preventive, diagnostic,
nor therapeutic. Such adverse effects may often occur even when a
drug is administered according to the manufacturer's directions. Unde-
sirable effects—such as sensitivity, allergic reactions, exaggerated
responses, or effect on an organ other than the one at which the
drug was directed—result from the qualitative variation in a patient's
reaction to treatment. Information on a drug's recurrent side effects,
or rarer but serious adverse reactions, is obviously important to a
doctor weighing alternative medications, especially since many side
effects are neither allergic nor unusual genetic reactions peculiar to
the patient, but rather pharmacological effects of the drug. Similarly,
the doctor must know what pathological conditions contraindicate use
of the drug.
The above statistics are taken from hospital records in studies
designed to measure the incidence of drug reactions. No such measure-
ment has been attempted in the case of the general public, but it is a
reasonable estimate that in the years ahead hundreds of thousands of
people will be injured or killed through the use of alleged life pre-
serving medications. Anaphylactic reactions to penicillin alone report-
edly occur in one to five out of every 1,000 patients, with about 90,000
such anaphylactic reactions occurring annually."'
Most of the adverse drug reactions might have been prevented if
information regarding all of the side effects known to the manufacturer
were freely released. In fact, doctors polled by an AMA study on
misleading advertising termed such failure to cite side effects "the
most heinous crime a pharmaceutical company can commit." 2" Drug
industry spokesmen counter by contending that physicians can obtain
full side-effect information elsewhere, particularly on the package
insert which must accompany each prescription drug, and by means
of the information appearing on all promotional labeling. They contend
that advertisements aimed solely at doctors serve merely as "product
reminders" and thus should not be treated as labeling. However, this
argument begs the question of the importance of journal advertising
in presenting drug news, and overstates the adequacy of alternative
sources of information on side effects. Doctors often ignore the vast
quantities of promotional labeling sent to their offices. They are most
280 Speech by Herbert Ley at a meeting of the New York Pharmaceutical Advertising
Club, Feb. 13, 1969, CCH F.D. Cosm. L. Rep. lj 80,215, at 80,519.
221 Shafer, Penicillin Reactions, 3 L. Med. J. 387 (1968). Indeed, this figure is
deemed conservative because of the incidence of unreported cases.
232 Council on Drugs of the American Medical Association Conference, Notes on the
Package Insert, 207 JA.M.A. 1335, 1337 (1969).
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apt to study ads appearing next to scientific articles in prestigious
medical publications. Furthermore, the package insert goes not to the
doctor who needs the "full disclosure" labeling but instead to pharm-
acists.
When a patient suffers the harmful effects of a prescription drug,
the issue is often phrased in terms of whether the drug company or the
physician should be legally responsible. It is conceivable, however, that
a third entity, the FDA, should assume a share of this responsibility
since it deemed the drug safe and its advertisements adequate. This
section will discuss the allocation of liability among these three entities.
A. Liability of the Government for Drug Reactions
At the heart of the Food and Drug Act is the requirement that
before a drug can be introduced into interstate commerce an applica-
tion must be filed with the FDA,' and approval for the drug's dis-
tribution secured from the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare."' The New Drug Application must contain full reports as to all
tests made on the drug, a description of its components and the fa-
cilities for manufacturing it, and samples of the drug and of proposed
labeling."' The Secretary may refuse to accept the application if he
finds there is insufficient information for a sound determination of
the drug's safety and effectiveness, or if he determines that the pro-
posed labeling is false or misleading. 23° The FDA also has the power
to suspend approval of an application and withdraw the drug from
the market if new tests and clinical experience show that the drug is
not safe for use under the conditions for which it was approved, or if
the application or labeling are found to contain false statements?'"
Before the Secretary can refuse to approve a new drug application or
remove a drug from the market, however, he must give the manufac-
turer a hearing in order to inform him of the contemplated actions. 238
Under the regulations, the FDA may intervene directly in the
preliminary stages of investigation and testing. 239
 The Secretary can re-
quire the manufacturer to submit a report indicating all proposed pre-
clinical testing, the names of those persons conducting the investigation,
reports on the results of any tests and investigations, and any other in-
formation which the Secretary deems necessary to evaluate the drug
233 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1964).
234 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (1964).
235 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1964).
286 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1964).
237 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1964).
238
 Id. The Secretary's ruling is subject to review in the federal courts. 21 U.S.0
§ 355(h) (1964).
230 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) ( 1 964).
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prior to its certification for use on humans.24° The FDA can halt fur-
ther testing if it becomes harmful or unnecessary, and prescribe certain
methods and procedures for more thorough investigations and tests.
Thus the FDA and the federal government have an important
duty to protect the public against the threat of unsafe and ineffective
drugs. The fact that perhaps millions of persons suffer from adverse
drug reactions each year, however, is evidence that the duty remains
unfulfilled. The law of products liability has grown steadily in this
country since the decisions in Thomas v. Winchester, 241 MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.,242 and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.'" At
present, a remedy is available to one injured by the negligence of the
drug manufacturer or the local pharmacist 2 44 This has opened to the
public the possibility of recovery for harm resulting from adverse re-
actions to drugs. Not all of the responsibility, however, can be placed
on the drug and pharmaceutical industries. The FDA, as the agent of
the government entrusted with the duty to regulate the promotion and
sale of drugs, is itself responsible for part of the problem. The 1962
amendments to the Food and Drug Act and the subsequent regulations
have enormous potential to reduce the suffering and waste caused by
useless and ineffective drugs. Yet, as one critic has warned: "No matter
what the potential of the law and the regulations . . . what counts in the
final analysis is their implementation—how FDA enforces them."'
Besides having a remedy against the private manufacturer, the
victim of an adverse drug reaction arguably should also have a cause of
action against the FDA. The liability of the federal government is con-
trolled by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24° which provides for excep-
tions to the sovereign immunity doctrine."' Any attempt to hold the
FDA responsible for the manner in which it enforces the regulations
240 21 U.S.C. 1 355(i) (1964).
241 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). A consumer recovered damages for personal injuries caused
by a falsely labeled bottle of poison. A duty was imposed on the seller because the harm
was foreseeable.
242 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Plaintiff recovered in negligence for injuries
caused by the careless manufacture of an automobile.
243 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Plaintiff sued for personal injuries caused by
failure of the steering mechanism on her new car. The court allowed recovery for breath
of an implied warranty of merchantability. See also, Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), holding that if there exists and "undisclosed defect in design,"
known to the manufacturer as a latent defect, "the duty of reasonable care should com-
mand a warning of this latent defect that could under certain circumstances accentuate
the possibility of severe injury." Id. at 505, 506.
244 See Keeton, Products Liability—Current Developments, 40 Texas L. Rev. 193
(1961); Rheingold, Products Liability—the Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18
Rutgers L. Rev. 947 (1964).
245 M. Mintz, The Therapeutic Nightmare 108 (1965).
240 28 U.S.C. 1* 1346, 2671 et. seq. (1964).
247 Id .
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and carries out the duties delegated to it must arise from the provisions
of this Act."' A successful action against the FDA or its employees
may mark a new era in the search for relief from the drug menace, and
assure that the powers of the FDA will be fully exercised and adminis-
tered.
The Federal Tort Claims Act grants to the district courts of the
United States exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions for damages re-
sulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee
of the government while acting within the scope of his employment."'
Under this Act, the government is liable in the same manner and to the
same extent that a private person would be under similar circum-
stances."' The surrender of sovereign immunity under the Act includes
all federal agencies in the executive department, independent establish-
ments of the government, and the employees of any federal agency. 24
There are several exceptions in the Act which limit its coverage, how-
ever, and not all federal agencies and employees can be made to answer
in court. The most perplexing of the exceptions and the only one of im-
portance to this discussion is found in subsection (a) of section 2680
and includes:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of any employee
of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regula-
tion be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused."'
Several district court decisions have construed these exceptions
narrowly; that is, against the allowance of claims and in favor of the
government.'" Although the Supreme Court has neither specifically
affirmed nor denied this narrow construction, its pronouncements tend
toward a more liberal application of the exceptions.'" With the excep-
248 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 25.03, at 444 (1958).
243 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
280 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
281 28 U.S.C. { 2671 (1964).
282 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
283 McNamara v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1961) ; Kearney v.
A'Hearn, 210 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
254 Compare Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) with Indian Towing Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) and Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
Indian Towing points out that the distinction made as to tort liability of municipal
corporations between governmental and non-governmental functions is not applicable to
the liability of the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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tion of a few district courts, most courts have handled subsection (a)
as a problem of application rather than a problem of construction.'"
The first of the exceptions contained in subsection (a) requires
that a federal agency exercise due care in the execution of a federal
statute or regulation for its acts to be immune. When something less
than due care is exercised by an agency or employee entrusted with the
execution of a statute or regulation, liability may attach for the result-
ing harm. 256
 The second exception contained in subsection (a) acts to
broaden the first by exempting federal agencies and employees from
liability based upon the performance or omission of a discretionary
function or duty, whether on not the discretion is abused. What Con-
gress intended to include in "discretionary function or duty" is unclear
from a reading of the Act, and as a result, the courts have applied the
section in several different ways.
In Dalehite v. United States, 257
 the Supreme Court distinguished
between an operational function of ,an agency and one that is discre-
tionary or planning in nature. The Court in that case pointed out that
this exception "was intended to cover more than the administration of
a statute or regulation because it appears disjunctively in the second
phrase of the section."'" As to the meaning of a discretionary or plan-
ning function that is given immunity by subsection (a), the Court
said: "It is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act
according to one's judgment of the best course, a concept of substan-
tial historical ancestry in American Law.'"" The Dalehite ruling is also
cited for the proposition that acts of subordinates in carrying out pro-
grams in accordance with discretionary decisions cannot be actionable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 2" Justice Jackson's dissent, how-
ever, pointed out that the adoption of such a view would "inaugurate
an unfortunate trend toward relaxation of private as well as official
responsibility in making, vending or transporting inherently dangerous
products."2" He argued that there are many governmental activities
255
 Most courts have preferred to refrain from making policy judgments that would
construe the exceptions contained in subsection (a).
250
 Idatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181 (1956).
257 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Dalehite was an action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages for a death resulting from an explosion of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer that had been produced according to government specifica-
tions. The Supreme Court held that the suit should be dismissed as a matter of law be-
cause the district courts do not have jurisdiction of a claim based upon a discretionary act
or duty of a federal agency within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2680(a) (1964).
255 Id. at 34.
250 Id. The Court cited Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ; Spald-
ing v. Vitas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) ; Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913) ; Louisiana v.
-McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914), as authority for the historical ancestory of its concept.
280. 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953).
281 Id. at 50.
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that are indistinguishable from those performed by private individuals,
and in this area there is no reason to impose immunity or relieve the
government or its officials from responsibility for acts performed with-
out due care for the safety and protection of others.'"
In 1955, the Supreme Court again faced the problem of applying
the exceptions of subsection (a). In Indian Towing Co. v. United
States,' the Court avoided the non-governmental--governmental
(proprietary vs. governmental) question that the Court in Dalehite
used to reach a favorable result for the government, and imposed lia-
bility for damages resulting from negligence in the care of a lighthouse.
The Court rejected the government's contention that there can be no
recovery based on the negligent performance of an activity which is
itself the end-purpose of the particular governmental function, by
pointing out that there was no basis for the distinction of governmental
activity from private activity on the operational leve1. 2" The Court
held that the Coast Guard need not have undertaken the operation of
the lighthouse, but that once its discretion had been exercised and pub-
lic reliance engendered, it was obligated to use due care to make certain
that the light was kept in working order."' As a result, the Coast
Guard was held liable for failure to perform the duty. Dalehite was not
expressly overruled but was greatly limited in application.
Application of the decision in Indian Towing has resulted in the
government's liability for negligently conducting a Civil Aeronautics
Administration survey,'" and for failure of Forest Service employees
to prevent the spread of a fire."' There are also many decisions holding
that once a government employee or agent acts after having exercised
his discretion at the planning level, the government will be liable for
any subsequent negligence. 208 Furthermore, there is authority for the
statement that the discretionary function exception furnishes no im-
munity to the government if a statute or regulation imposes a manda-
tory duty to perform the function.'"
Before suit may be instituted against the United States, the claim-
ant must have first presented his claim to the appropriate federal
agency, and the claim must have been denied. 27° The statute itself
202 Id. at 60.
saS 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
264 Id. at 68.
205 Id. at 69.
sea Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956).
297 Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
298 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952) Costely v. United
States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Bullock v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 88.5 (D. Utah
1955) ; Rufino v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Fair v. United States,
234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
200 Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951).
270 28 U.S.C. 2675 (1964).
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designates neither who may maintain a suit nor those individuals who
must be sued. The courts, however, refuse to permit a plaintiff to join
the United States and one of its employees as co-defendants. 271 But it
is not necessary to sue the United States; if a plaintiff so chooses, he
may sue only the individual employee." An exception is the statutory
immunity from personal liability recently granted to medical and para-
medical employees of the Veteran's Administration unless the claim is
first submitted to and denied by the V.A.' Claims alleging malpractice
or negligence in furnishing medical care and treatment by physicians,
dentists, pharmacists, and paramedical and other personnel in the
V.A.'s Department of Medicine and Surgery are covered by the new
law."' Should the plaintiff elect to sue the United States rather than the
negligent employee, and be successful in recovering a judgment, he
cannot thereafter bring an action to recover damages from the em-
ployee whose negligence gave rise to the claim." Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has held that the government cannot recover indemnity
from the employee for whose negligence it has been required to pay
damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act 27° It is also noteworthy
that an employee of the government who voluntarily testifies for the
plaintiff in an action against the government may subject himself to
criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 283, which prohibits govern-
ment employees from assisting in the prosecution of claims against the
United States.'
The above exceptions must be considered when attempting to im-
pose responsibility on the FDA under the Federal Tort Claims Act. As
noted previously," the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the
regulations of the FDA prescribe strict standards for the approval of
New Drug Applications and for the removal of drugs from the market
271 Prechtl v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 889 (W.D.N.Y. 1949) ; Uarte v. United
States, 7 F.R.D. 705 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
272 The rule in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), that a suit cannot be
maintained against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for death or injury
of a soldier on active duty, was followed in Buckingham v. United States, 394 F.2d 483
(4th Cir. 1968). Nor can a soldier sue an army physician for negligent acts performed In
the line of duty. Permitting a soldier to litigate civilly with others in the Army would
weaken discipline. Baily v. De Quevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
923 (1967).
273
 38 U.S.C.A. § 4116 (Supp. 1969).
274 V.A. Reg. 6(E) §§ 5514.1, 5611-13.
275 28 US.C.A. § 2672 (Supp. 1969).
276 United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
277 See United States v. 679.19 Acres of Land, 113 F, Supp. 590 (D.N.D. 1953);
United States v. Adams, 115 F. Supp. 731 (D.N.D. 1953). In the former case a govern-
ment employee was ordered by the court to testify against the government. The govern-
ment then brought a criminal prosecution against the employee in the latter case under
18 U.S.C. § 283. The court dismissed the indictment holding that the section is not ap-
plicable to proceedings before a court.
278 M. Mintz, supra note 245, at 2.
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at the discretion of the Secretary?" The Act specifies several grounds
fur the refusal of a New Drug Application or for the subsequent with-
drawal of the drug from the market, but it is phrased so as to give the
Secretary broad discretion in exercising his judgment at the planning
level to decide how the public can best be protected. Before making a
final determination, the Secretary must give the applicant due notice
and an opportunity for a hearing. 2" There is no duty imposed upon the
Secretary to follow any specified course of action; within certain guide-
lines, approval and withdrawal of new drugs are left to officials at the
planning level of the FDA."' Since the Secretary and the FDA are free
to determine what tests shall be reasonable and adequate, and to estab-
lish the requirements for labeling, courts would probably be quick to
bring this function of the FDA under the discretionary exception of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 282
 Thus, the victims of drug-induced in-
jury must look to Congress and the executive branch of the government
for help in motivating the FDA to carry out the authority delegated to
it to screen out harmful or ineffective new drugs already on the market.
Only through the continued pressure of congressional investigation and
presidential policy-making can the FDA's record in this area be im-
proved.
Other functions of the FDA are either mandatory or at least ar-
guably operational in character so as to come within the purview of
Dalehite. As mentioned previously, the Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act requires that the Secretary promulgate regulations regarding
the certification of antibiotics and insulin. 283 Within statutory guide-
lines, the content of these regulations is left to the discretion of the
Secretary so as not to disturb the policy-making discretion of the
agency. Once the regulations are prescribed, however, the situation be-
comes much like that in Indian Towing. That is, when this discretion
is exercised, and the procedures and standards are promulgated, their
enforcement is an operational function and the agency is bound to ex-
ercise due care. 284 The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act states
that the purpose of the regulations concerning the certification of each
batch of insulin or of an antibiotic is to "adequately insure safety and
efficacy of use." 285 If a drug which is certified as having met the estab-
lished standards of safety and quality causes harm, it would seem that
279 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1964) ; 21 C.F.R. § 1.100 (1969).
28o 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(e), (h) (1964).
281 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (1964).
282 See Meyer v. G. D. Searle & Co., 41 F,R.D. 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
288 21 U.S.C. §t 356, 357 (1964) ; 21 C.F.R. § 141-46 (1969).
284 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U,S. 61 (1955); Bullock v. United
States, 145 F. Supp. 824 (D. Utah 1956) ; Swanson v. United States, 229 F. Supp, 217
(N.D. Cal. 1964).
286 21 U.S.C. ft 356(a), 357(a) (1964).
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part of the responsibility must be borne by the FDA. To establish the
agency's responsibility, the litigant might argue that the regulations
pertaining to the certification of each batch of insulin or of an antibi-
otic set out the standards to be followed at the operational level of
activity, thus avoiding the exceptions of subsection (a) of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. The litigant must also prove that his damages were
the result of the negligence of the FDA in allowing the marketing of a
substandard, unsafe batch of insulin or antibiotics. Imposing such re-
sponsibility on the FDA, and requiring the government to respond in
damages in a civil suit, might furnish the necessary incentive to the
FDA to improve its past record of laxity and carelessness.
The only decision in a tort action involving the FDA was a claim
for negligence in government sampling and inspection brought by a
wholesaler of imported tomato paste. The government claimed the
paste was adulterated and refused to accept it in fulfillment of a gov-
ernment contract. The wholesaler's claim was rejected by the court on
the ground that the duty imposed on the government was to the ulti-
mate consumer and not to an intermediate dealer. 28° However, the
sampling activity under the statute involved in this case required the
testing only of such samples as the government deemed advisable. On
the other hand, under the drug amendments of 1962, the FDA's new
drug approval duty is absolute and induces reliance on the consumer's
part that every new drug will be carefully examined for safety and
efficacy before marketing is permitted.
The fact that the law now specifies that the FDA approve New
Drug Applications on the basis of submitted evidence of both safety
and effectiveness, and that the law gives the FDA new and increased
powers and authority over every phase of drug manufacturing, may
lead the courts to hold that the FDA is in the position of warranting
the safety and efficacy of these drugs.'" If the Federal Tort Claims
Act were held a bar to government liability, an anomalous situation
would exist: the government has undertaken a duty, and yet has suc-
cessfully absolved itself of any liability failing careful performance of
that duty.288
No judicial decision has yet involved a product liability action for
injury caused by a drug in its investigational stage, nor has there been
a reported malpractice decision involving such a drug. 289 The only case
289 Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957).
287 Note, Federal Food and Drug Administration Practice and Procedure for New
Drug Approval, 37 Temp. L.Q. 191, 193-94 (1964).
288 Note, The Drug Amendments of 1962: How Much Regulation?, 18 Rutgers L.
Rev. 101, 160 (1963).
289 Stetler, Responsibility of the Food and Drug Administration Under Federal Tort
Claims Act, 72 Dick. L. Rev. 580, 586 (1968).
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involving the government and an investigational drug was Meyer v.
G. D. Searle & Co."° The complaint was based on the allegation that
use of an oral contraceptive damaged the heart. Causes of action
against Searle were for negligence, breach of warranty, and misrepre-
sentation. The complaint alleged a separate cause of action against the
FDA for negligence in permitting the marketing of the product, not-
withstanding its notice and knowledge of the potential danger of the
drug. Also cited as indicia of FDA negligence was the failure to order
withdrawal of the drug from the market on the basis that the drug was
unsafe for clinical use, or at least to order that warnings of potential
danger accompany the product. The government moved to dismiss on
the ground its action involved the exercise of discretion. Plaintiff found
the government's brief "persuasive" and discontinued its action.
If liability for negligence is imposed on the FDA by the courts, it
should be comprehensive. For example, it would be inadequate to allow
a claim against the government or against individual FDA officials only
for the negligent approval of a New Drug Application. Were this the
extent of the liability, the general bureaucratic preference for negative
rather than positive action would be aggravated. To overcome inertia
and the resulting increased reluctance to approve a new drug for mar-
keting until an excessive amount of clinical data is accumulated, liabil-
ity should be imposed for negative action as well. A member of the
public would then have a claim if he were denied the benefit he might
otherwise have obtained from a new drug except for the FDA's negli-
gently withheld and unnecessarily delayed approval. "The public in-
terest demands that the risks of inaction, as well as the risks of action,
must be taken into consideration in decision-making regarding the
clinical testing of drugs. 71201
A complete solution to the problem of drug reactions and the
abuses that accompany ineffective drugs may never be found, but
means to control the problem are available. If effectively used, these
partial solutions can reduce the hazards facing the drug consumers.
The general public must become well informed of the dangers that
drugs present and the harm they can cause if used improperly. The
medical profession must use every available resource to insure the
proper use of drugs to combat disease without bringing on adverse re-
actions. Drug companies must put the safety of the public before profit-
seeking motives in determining when drugs are safe for marketing. The
most effective means of controlling the drug menace, however, is
through the FDA. Having assumed the leadership in regulating and
290 41 F.R.D. 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
291 Herrell, Clinical Investigation: Why Make it More Difficult?, 2 Int. Med. Dig. 7
(1967).
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controlling the drug industry, the federal government must also be
deemed to have assumed liability for failure to carry out its tasks with
due care and diligence.
B. Liability of the Physician for Adverse Drug Reactions
Whether in the form of pure food and drug statutes imposing lia-
bility on a negligence per se basis, or under a theory of warranty, all
jurisdictions, in one way or another, hold the dispenser of adulterated
drugs liable to the victimized consumer. Normally, the physician nei-
ther sells nor dispenses drugs, but merely prescribes them or orders
them on a hospital chart. However, many physicians dispense free sam-
ples of various drugs to their patients as an accommodation, or dispense
them for a fee from a stock which they maintain. In either situation,
the physician is no longer acting merely as a prescriber, but becomes a
dispenser of drugs as well, and as such it would seem that no court
would find serious difficulty in holding him liable if the drugs were in
fact adulterated or otherwise unwholesome. It is quite unlikely that
one would find a case in which a physician dispensed to a patient an
adulterated or unwholesome drug which could be proved the proximate
cause of some condition of illness, disability or death. If such a case
did arise, however, since liability is generally imposed upon hospitals
where the preparation, storage or dispensation of a drug can be proven
to be the proximate cause of harm to the patient, 202 then these same
functions performed by a doctor should cause him to be similarly liable.
The more frequently recurring, and the more difficult problem is
the adverse reaction of a recipient of a drug or medicine prescribed by
a physician or ordered by him on the hospital order sheet. This type of
case appears to be similar to that of any other malpractice situation.
The duty incumbent upon a physician to warn his patient of any risks
involved in the use of a prescribed drug is not coextensive with his
duty to warn of some reasonable and recognized risks inherent in a
particular medical or surgical procedure. The duty to warn is less en-
compassing when a drug is involved. The doctor is obligated only to
explain any possible adverse reactions of the drug, not its composition
or even necessarily its intended effect."'
If a particular drug is known to have side effects which may prove
injurious to the patient, the physician should make a reasonably full
disclosure of the risks involved before obtaining consent to administer
the drug.294 A patient who developed exfoliative dermatitis after a
292 See generally 9 ALR3d 567 (1966).
293 See Morse, Law and Medicine: Drug Reactions, 197 J.A.M.A. 221 (1966).
294 See Your Professional Liability: 131 Questions and Answers, 185 J.A.MA. 789,
793 (1963). Before prescribing a dangerous drug for administration to an infant, a phy-
sician should inform the parents of possible dangers "unlikely to be suspected" by them,
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series of gold salt injections for rheumatoid arthritis was entitled to re-
cover damages in a suit against her, physician. The evidence showed
that no emergency existed in treating her condition, and that the med-
ical profession recognized the possibility of undesirable reactions in the
use of gold therapy. Under the circumstances, the physician had the
duty of making a reasonable disclosure of the known dangers incidental
to or possible in the proposed use of gold. The appellate court said,
therefore, that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the
physician could be found guilty of professional negligence if he failed
to inform the patient properly. 2" In another case, the patient was given
phenobarbital with directions to take "one when necessary for pain"
without warning as to the possible effects on his mental and physical
faculties. Liability for negligence was imposed upon his physician when
the patient took several capsules and then drove off the road."'
In a third case,' a bus passenger injured in an accident sued the
driver's physician alleging that the crash was attributable to a side ef-
fect of a prescribed antihistamine. The driver testified that the doctor
gave him no warning of any possible side effects of the particular drug
involved. He took the first pill the morning of the accident, felt groggy
and drowsy a few miles before the accident, then fell asleep or blacked
out shortly before the bus left the road. Several physicians testified that
since about 20 percent of those persons taking the drug experience
these reactions, the community standard required a doctor to alert a
patient for whom he prescribed the drug of the potential consequences.
Judgment by the trial court in favor of the physician was reversed by
the state supreme court, which held there was sufficient evidence to
raise the jury question: Did the physician fail to warn the driver of any
possible side effects of the drug? If the jury determined the physician
gave no such warning, it could find negligence, and this raised a second
jury question: Did this negligence constitute the proximate cause of
the passenger's injuries?
A doctor may be liable for a resulting harm if he fails to give ade-
quate instruction as to the care required when a patient's condition is
such that he must exercise more than ordinary care in order to avoid
injury after medical treatment. He may also be liable if he was negli-
gent in failing to make responsible efforts to determine whether the
thus giving them "the opportunity of an informed election," particularly since such a
warning "would in no way induce nervousness in the patient so as to decrease likelihood
of successful treatment." Koury v. Follow, 272 N.C. 366, 375, 158 S,E.2d 548, 555-56
(1968). Alleged failure of physicians to warn the parents of an infant of the dangers in-
volved in administering chloramphenicol has been held actionable. Sharpe v. Pugh, 270
N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967).
299 DeRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510, 261 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1965).
206 Whitfield v. Daniel Constr. Co., 226 S.C. 37, 40, 83 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1954).
297 Kaiser v. Suburban Trans. System, 398 P.2d 14 (1965).
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patient was allergic to the drug, or if he administered the drug for a
disease for which it was not an approved therapeutic 2 08
When prescribing medication, a physician must clearly specify the
dosage to be given, as well as the mode and route of administration.'"
Careful instructions should be given on possible side effects and any
dangers inherent in the use of the drug, especially if taken in combina-
tion with another drug or with alcohol. Admitted faults of most physi-
cians include their generally illegible handwriting, which is a common
source of prescription error, and their failure to write complete pre-
scriptions, a practice which leaves the nurse to decide which of several
dosage forms to use.
Physicians must also know and follow local law and practice con-
cerning drugs or liability may unexpectedly result. For example, the
Attorney General of Iowa ruled that a physician may not authorize his
nurse or an intern to prescribe or dispense prescription drugs.'" The
statutes provide that a nurse or intern may administer such drugs, but
they may do so only when acting under the direction and supervision
of the medical practitioner who prescribed them.
As the number and potency of drugs increase, errors in medication
become more common and more serious. The untoward consequences
of prescribing and administering drugs may stem from a variety of cir-
cumstances, including prescription or administration of the wrong drug
or dosage, or failure to administer the proper medication at the speci-
fied time or in the manner prescribed or normally considered accept- •
able. Untoward effects may also result from failure to diagnose and
treat properly adverse drug reactions. Apparently the vast majority of
medication errors go undetected. A recently reported method of de-
tecting and counting medication errors in a non-university hospital
disclosed the startling statistic that nearly one out of seven medica-
tions given or prescribed was an erroneous medication."' Therefore, it
would seem that a physician must be held responsible for knowing
that which is known . or reasonably discoverable about the drugs he
prescribes. A physician should be duty-bound to be familiar with the
manufacturer's flyer accompanying all prescription drugs. He should
certainly be responsible for knowing the commentary on any drug he
prescribes as contained in the "Physician's Desk Reference." Further,
208
 Ratan v. Greenbaum, 273 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
200 Campbell v. Preston, 379 S.W.2d 557 (1964).
"0 Opinion of the Iowa Attorney General, No. 68-4-.1 (Iowa, April 1, 1968) as cited
in 17 The Citation 121 (1968).
801 Barker, Kembrough, & Heller, The Medication Error Problem in Hospitals, 1
Hosp. Formulary Mgmt. 29 (1966) ; Hospital Medication Errors, 195 J.A.M.A. 31 (1966);
Fogg, Errors of Medication in Hospital, 2 Lancet 31 (1965).
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the physician should be required to conduct a physical examination
and study the medical history of an individual to ascertain whether
there is any contraindication in the particular patient for the drug
prescribed.
It would, of course, be elementary on the part of the physician to
prescribe not only the right drug for the given patient's condition, but
in the right quantity as well. Liability in a given case might be predi-
cated upon an excess or possibly even an insufficient dosage. The doc-
tor who exceeds the dosage specified on the package insert accom-
panying a drug, or who chooses to ignore a statement of adverse side
effects or contraindications, may have assumed the burden of proving
that he was correct in his judgment. In a New Jersey malpractice case,
the insert in a package of epinephrine with lidocaine (Eylocaine)
became the plaintiff's chief weapon against a dentist who had admin-
istered the drug to a hypertensive woman.'" The burden of proof for
the physician can be extremely difficult when one puts the vague
language of a journal article concerning the drug against the definite
and authoritative language of a package insert. Indeed, the burden will
be impossible to overcome if the insert is treated as the exclusive
authority on dosage and contraindication."'
In summary, it would seem clear that it is the duty of the physi-
cian to conduct follow up observations of the patient to detect early
signs of adverse drug reactions. Physicians have been known to dismiss
as crank calls the complaints of patients alleging peculiar reactions to
a prescribed drug when early follow up might have prevented injury to
the patient. It would likewise seem self-evident that the physician is
obliged not only to be able to recognize an adverse drug reaction, but
to treat it as well.
Questions which determine the liability of a physician in a case
involving an adverse drug reaction should include whether the reaction
was within the known scope of medical knowledge for the use of the
drug; whether the reaction was discoverable in the particular patient;
whether after the reaction proper treatment was instituted and contin-
ued; whether the patient was properly informed of the hazards and
8°2 Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961).
Boa Legal counsel for the FDA has suggested that publishers, authors, and editors of
medical journals who have approved and published drug dosages deviating from those on
package inserts recommended by the FDA are liable for damages to the patient and to the
pharmaceutical manufacturer (for injury to its good will). Such a statement is of ques-
tionable legal validity, however, and impairs free expression among the editors, publishers,
and researchers who provide needed data on drug effects and dosage. Indeed, expert au-
thors have withdrawn important articles on drugs because of the fear engendered by FDA
pronouncements. Modell, Editorial: F.D.A. Censorship, S J. Clin. Pharmacal. & Therap.
359 (1967).
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risks inherent in the use of the particular drug for his given condition;
whether more benign or established drugs could and should have been
used first; and whether the drug itself was contraindicated medically
in the particular case.
It must be remembered that the choice of a particular drug or
medicine as well as the dosage to be taken by the patient go to the very
heart of the somewhat trite but nevertheless true saying that medicine
is an art rather than a science. Rarely will the physician be held liable
for a mistake in judgment which seemed reasonable at the time of pre-
scription, but proved disastrous in result. There are many hypersensi-
tive, toxic and allergic reactions which cannot be prevented even with
reasonable diligence and foresight, or which involve an infinitesimally
small risk in relation to the high probability of beneficial results to the
patient. As in most cases of malpractice liability, expert testimony in
this area will usually be required and will be exceptionally hard to ob-
tain. These suggested guidelines, however, might aid in determining
potential areas of liablility for the physician, and in making a finding
of negligence or due care.
C. Liability of the Drug Manufacturer for Adverse
Drug Reactions
Who should bear the loss suffered by the victims of unavoidable
injuries from "idiosyncratic" reactions (whether allergic or otherwise)
to prescription drugs? Can we justify making the innocent victim of an
"idiosyncratic" reaction bear the total burden of his physical impair-
ment and the costs of his medical care? The terms "unreasonably
dangerous" and "defective" are merely legal labels for value judgments
as to who should bear the loss in drug reaction cases. These terms have
meaning only to the extent we choose to give them meaning. Looking at
a particular drug from a plaintiff's point of view, one may ask whether
it was not unreasonably dangerous and defective as to him? Courts
have denied recovery because a particular plaintiff cannot amass a his-
tory of similar unfortunate cases, but it seems perverse indeed to re-
quire that a great many persons be injured before we compensate any.
Moreover, it seems improper to require specific proof of a defect when
the current state of medical knowledge has turned the term "idiosyn-
cratic" into a verbal wastebasket, a receptacle for all kinds of defects
for which there is yet no explanation. These facts are apparently ig-
nored when drug analysis is extended no further than the conclusory
labels "defect" and "unreasonably dangerous." The following discus-
sion will attempt to explain some of the meanings of those labels, along
with the probable methods of obtaining more equitable results in cases
of idiosyncratic reactions.
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1. Duty to Warn Physicians of Adverse Drug Reactions
When a manufacturer markets prescription drugs, it is under a
duty to warn physicians of the possible side effects of the drug for the
protection of patients.'" Failure to warn may be considered a failure
to exercise a reasonable standard of care, and may expose the manu-
facturer to liability for negligence. 8"
The ultimate concern of any regulation or requirement should be
for the patient who is injured as a result of a non-defective drug, ade-
quately tested and properly manufactured, which carried with it ade-
quate warnings of harmful side effects of which the manufacturer knew
or had •reason to know. To date, however, the majority of the extant
decisions involve a negligence question, so that the problem of non-
negligence resulting in injury has not been conclusively decided.
In discussing negligence, it is important to note that the courts, in
their efforts to assist plaintiffs within the framework of existing law,
are stringent in the requirements of due care which they impose upon
drug manufacturers. In recent years, the duty to warn has become an
increasingly significant obligation in the area of product liability!"
Just as a manufacturer's liability for injury resulting from its product's
defects has been extended beyond the original purchaser to all who
could reasonably be expected to use the product or be injured in the
course of its use, its duty to warn of dangers or defects in its products
has likewise been expanded.
Perhaps the most stringent application of this duty to warn can be
seen in two opinions of the Eighth Circuit. Both involved the drug
chloroquine phosphate, marketed under the trade name "Aralen" by
Sterling Drug, Inc. The first case, Sterling Products, Inc. v. Cor-
nish,'" affirmed an award of $80,000 for an arthritis victim who de-
veloped chloroquine retinopathy as a result of using Aralen. The
evidence indicated that chloroquine retinopathy is a relatively recent
medical discovery. The first article to describe the condition was pub-
lished in a British medical journal in October, 1959. The defendant
manufacturer, however, made revisions in some of its literature con-
cerning Aralen as early as June, 1960. The plaintiff took the drug daily
from November, 1959, to December, 1962, with a resulting extensive
and permanent impairment of her vision. In June, 1963, after the plain-
804 A.M.A. News, April 22, 1968, at 13. See also Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co.,
411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969) ; Parke Davis & Co. v. Stromsod, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir.
1969) ; Note, The Manufacturer's Duty to Warn of Dangers Involved in Use of a Product,
1967 Wash. U. L.Q. 206 (1967).
3 °6 fine v. Sterling Drug Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623 (1969).
806
 See 2 L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability 16 (1968) ; 1 R. Hursch,
American Law of Products Liability 1§ 2,28-2.29 (1961).
3°7 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
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tiff's injury, the. manufacturer sent a letter to all physicians calling
their attention to the retinal side effect of Aralen.808 The trial judge
instructed the jury that if the manufacturer knew or should have
known that a group of persons would suffer this side effect, then it had
a duty to warn the medical profession of the susceptibility of the hy-
persensitive or idiosyncratic group. The manufacturer objected to this
instruction on the ground that its duty to warn did not extend to those
few individuals who might be injured because of their unusual hyper-
sensitivity to its product. In rejecting the manufacturer's position, the
court drew a distinction between the duty to warn hypersensitive or
idiosyncratic persons with respect to over-the-counter retail drugs and
a drug sold on a physician's prescription. The denial of relief in the
retail sales situation, the court said, seemed to be based upon the un-
foreseeability of the injury and the futility of the warning. However,
the court stated:
In the instant case there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find that the drug manufacturer did in fact know, and
thus could have foreseen, that some persons would be injured
by the drug's side effect. Moreover, in this case we are dealing
with a prescription drug rather than a normal consumer item.
In such a case the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermedi-
ary between the purchaser and the manufacturer."'"
The court found the evidence sufficient to sustain the finding that
since medical literature on the subject was available, the manufacturer
knew or should have known that the product was causing retinal dam-
age to some users. While the question of the timeliness and effective-
ness of the manufacturer's warning was properly left to the jury, the
court did conclude that the warning must reasonably be expected to
apprise the prescribing doctor of the dangerous side effects connected
with a drug:
If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side
effect in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms nor-
mally accompanying the side effect, there is an excellent
chance that injury to the patient can be avoided 810
In the second case, Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,811 a federal
court in South Dakota found the drug company negligent for failure
to warn, and awarded the plaintiff $180,000 for blindness attributed to
808
 See Products Liability—Prescription Drug—Duty of Manufacturer to Warn
Physician, 19 Defense 49 (1970).
an 370 F.2d at 85.
810 Id.
811
 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1961), aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
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the side effects of Aralen. In this case, the plaintiff complained to
her physician of increased discomfort from an arthritic condition that
had been bothering her since 1950. Her doctor, unaware of any irre-
versible side effects which might result from its prolonged use, pre-
scribed daily doses of chloroquine phosphate. He had been introduced
to the drug by a detail man employed by Sterling Drug, Inc. When the
detail man acquainted the physician with the drug, he did not inform
the doctor of Aralen's dangerous side effects, nor, on any of his subse-
quent visits, did he disclose the possible connection between Aralen
and chloroquine retinopathy.
Although Sterling disseminated information concerning the side
effects of Aralen as these became known, 3" the company never in-
structed its detail men to discuss the newly discovered dangers with
the physicians they contacted. Thus, none of Sterling's warnings gained
the attention of Mrs. Yarrow's physician. The Aralen treatment con-
tinued until October, 1964, when her doctor learned of the connection
between Aralen and irreversible chloroquine retinopathy from an oph-
thalmologist who examined Mrs. Yarrow and found substantial deteri-
oration of her vision. Although the use of chloroquine phosphate was
discontinued, her eyesight continued to deteriorate. In early 1965, an
eye specialist determined that Aralen had deprived Mrs. Yarrow of
80 percent of her vision.
Mrs. Yarrow filed suit against Sterling in the United States District
Court for the District of South Dakota to recover for the damage to
her eyes. The district court held that Sterling was negligent in failing
to warn the physician of known dangers involved in the use of Aralen.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed, and held that a drug manufacturer's duty to warn includes
instructing its detail men to warn physicians on whom they regularly
call of all dangerous side effects involved in the use of the manufac-
turer's drugs when the manufacturer knows, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should know of the existence of such side effects. The
importance of the Yarrow case lies in its expansion of the drug in-
dustry's responsibility to warn physicians of the dangerous side effects
of drugs.
Drug manufacturers usually adhere to standard, industry-wide
methods of communicating the necessary warnings to practitioners.
These methods include use of the Physician's Desk Reference, and
812
 Information concerning the relationship between Aralen and chloroquine retin-
apathy began appearing in 1957. By 1963 the connection was well established. The con-
dition was found to develop in a small percentage of those treated with Aralen on a
daily basis for a significant length of time. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 1/.26 918,
985-87 (8th Cir. 1969).
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"product cards" distributed to physicians. The use of standard in-
dustry-wide practices to discharge the manufacturer's obligation to
warn, however, has not always satisfied the courts. In Blohm v. Card-
well Manufacturing Co.,'" the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed
out that although accepted industry-wide practices would be admissible
as evidence to show that the manufacturer's warning had been reason-
able, they were in no way conclusive.'" In the words of one writer:
"[i] t should be remembered . . . that occasionally an entire industry
has been found lacking in ordinary care."'
Similarly, although drug manufacturers are required by the FDA
to relay specific warnings regarding certain drugs, those warnings have
also been considered minimal guidelines rather than conclusive evi-
dence that the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in warning
physicians about its products. In Love v. Wolf,'" for example, where
defendant Parke-Davis issued a specific warning authorized by the
FDA for the drug in question, the California appellate court held the
warning inadequate since it did not properly convey the serious nature
of the drug's hazards. Parke-Davis had advertised and promoted the
drug on a large scale after the dangers had been discovered, thus
undermining the effect of the warnings that had been given. Hence,
although the warnings had been widely distributed, they were inade-
quate because the gravity of the danger had been de-emphasized.
Further indication that mere compliance with the FDA's warning
requirement will not provide a complete defense can be found in
Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co 8 17 In approving a $500,000 recovery
in favor of a brain-damaged infant, the court held:
Although all of the Government regulations and requirements
had been satisfactorily met in the production and marketing
of quadrigen, the standards promulgated were minimal. The
Defendant still owes a duty to warn of dangers of which it
knew or should have known in the exercise of reasonable
care.818
In the Yarrow case, the Eighth Circuit re-examined the sufficiency
of the industry's warning practices in determining whether Sterling
had made a reasonable effort to alert Mrs. Yarrow's doctor to Aralen's
813 380 F.2d 341 (lath Cir. 1967).
814 Id. at 343. See Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 350
F.2d 273, 278 (8th Cir. 1965).
815 Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or
Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43, 52 (1965).
no 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964).
817 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966), aff'd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969).
818 Id. at 997. See Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem., 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C.
1965).
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dangerous side effects. Sterling had issued its warnings in three different
ways: through the Physician's Desk Reference,"" through product
cards,"° and by use of a "Dear Doctor" letter, which it mailed to every
physician in the United States."' These methods had been approved,
either expressly or impliedly, in earlier suits against Sterling for in-
juries caused by Aralen. In Cornish,'" although the Eighth Circuit held
that Sterling's use of the Physician's Desk Reference and product cards
was inadequate, the court did imply that the "Dear Doctor" letter may
have constituted a sufficient warning had it been issued earlier.'' In
Yarrow, Sterling argued strenuously that the "Dear Doctor" letter was
evidence that it had made a reasonable effort to warn, but neither the
district court nor the court of appeals was persuaded. The district
court stated:
Where the doctor is inundated with the literature and product
cards of the various drug manufacturers, as shown here by
the facts, a change in the literature or an additional letter
intended to present new information on drugs to the doctor
is insufficient. The most effective method employed by the
drug company in the promotion of new drugs is shown to be
the use of detail men; thus, the Court feels that this would
also present the most effective method of warning the doctor
about recent developments in drugs already employed by the
doctor, at no great additional expense." 4
The decision suggests that the information provided by drug warnings
in the mail is not adequate. The type of duty to warn imposed upon
the drug company would seem to require its detail men to ring the
bell of every physician personally, and give adequate and timely warn-
818 The warnings published in the Physician's Desk Reference from 1958 until 1961
concerning the side effects of Aralen referred to "visual disturbances." There was no listing
of Aralen in the Physician's Desk Reference in 1962. In 1963, the warning included pos-
sible blurring of vision, corneal changes, and retinal changes that were unusual and ir-
reversible. In 1964, the warning was substantially the same, although it contained more
specific information regarding retinal change, which was still regarded as rare and ir-
reversible. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1967).
820 Id. The product card on Aralen in 1957 warned of blurring of vision as a side
effect of Aralen. In 1959, the card warned of temporary blurring of vision and corneal
changes, advising periodic eye examinations. In 1960, it warned of temporary blurring of
vision, retinal vascular response, macular lesions, and again advised periodic eye exami-
nations. The same warning was given in 1961, and in 1962 the card suggested tri-monthly
examinations.
821 Letter from E. J. Foley to American Physicians, undated, reprinted in Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 988 (8th Cir. 1969).
822 Sterling Prods., Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
323 Id. at 84. The injury to Cornish was sustained before the letter was circulated.
824 Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 163, aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th
Cir. 1969).
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ing of the dangers of a drug as promptly as such dangers become known.
Such a requirement is not unreasonable in light of the fact that detail
men make such personal visits when promoting the drug.
Although affirming on appeal, the court of appeals undertook a
somewhat different approach to the problem, ignoring the proposition
that the manufacturer was required to warn by the "most effective
method":
Under the circumstances of this case, when the dangers of
the prolonged use of this drug, mass produced and sold in
large quantities, became reasonably apparent, it was not un-
reasonable to find that appellant should have employed all its
usual means of communication, including detail men, to warn
the prescribing physician of these dangers. In this connection,
it is noted that no extraordinary means of giving a warning
of high intensity was employed."'
Although it attempted to do so, the reviewing court never quite recon-
ciled its holding with that of the trial court. Rather than being con-
cerned with the most effective method of warning, the Eighth Circuit
held that detail men must be used to relay to the physicians on whom
they regularly call information on a drug's potentially hazardous side
effects."' Because the court refused to say that the lower court had
erred, and nevertheless proceeded to make a different statement of the
applicable law, there remains confusion as to what standard of care
the courts will demand in the future.
In requiring that Sterling make use of its detail men in discharging
its duty to warn, the court appeared to be interested in protecting the
public from the sometimes unconcerned drug industry. If so, this would
not be the first time that the drug industry's seeming lack of concern
for its consumers had vexed the judiciary.
In essence, Yarrow demands that detail men be used as advisors
to the physicians with whom they regularly meet, rather than merely
as fast-talking salesmen. The question therefore arises as to how far
the courts can go in trying to achieve this type of arrangement; how
far can courts go to require a manufacturer to discourage the use of
his product? By requiring that a manufacturer's detail men inform
physicians of a drug's risks as well as its benefits, Yarrow has en-
abled the physician to make a more informed decision, and thus has
taken a step in the direction of greater protection for patients who use
prescription drugs.
235 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 109).
820 id.
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2. Strict Liability in Tort for Adverse Drug Reactions
The principal argument advanced for the extension of strict lia-
bility where the manufacturer could not reasonably have known of the
risks of a particular defect, is the benefit to be achieved by the distribu-
tion of loss through the use of insurance.'" The cost of insurance then
becomes a cost of production, passed on to the consumer through the
price, and is thus absorbed by the beneficiaries of the enterprise"
There has been steady progress throughout the last half-
century in providing safer products and in shifting the risks
of enterprise through insurance and price controls back to
the consumers. In this way the group carries most of the load
and no one is excessively burdened. The imposition of the
risks of enterprise upon the victim alone has now, in varying
degrees, been rejected everywhere."'
Proponents argue that strict liability is preferable to a system of liabilty
based on fault where an enterprise or activity, beneficial to many, takes
a more or less inevitable accidental toll of human life or limb. All limita-
tions imposed by the doctrine of privity would be dispensed with, and
strict liability would be imposed upon the manufacturer on an implied
warranty against unreasonable dangers lurking in any kind of product.
Liability would extend to anyone hurt by a foreseeable use of the
product.
About one-third of all American courts now impose strict liability
for injuries resulting from the consumption of food.'" Manufacturers
are liable not because of fault, nor because they could have prevented
the risks, but because they can best distribute this unavoidable cost to
all persons who benefit from the enterprise.'" For example, in a lengthy
concurring opinion, containing a number of arguments for strict liabil-
ity, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court stated:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unpre-
pared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the
loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to
the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury
1327
 See, e.g., Comment, Cigarettes and Vaccine: Unforeseeable Risks in Manufac-
turers' Liability under Implied Warranty, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (1963).
328
 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale
L.J. 499 (1961).
829
 Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negli-
gence ?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 928, 937 (1957).
880 Noel, Manufacturers of Products—The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 Tenn.
L. Rev. 963 (1967).
881
 Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manufacturers' Lia-
ability Without Fault in Tort and Warranty, 65 Yale L. J. 262 (1955).
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can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business.. . .832
No other justices concurred in his opinion, and since no opinion of the
Supreme Court of California has agreed, Traynor's view is not yet the
law of California.
Professor Prosser proposes that the "risk-spreading" argument be
accorded more respect. The manufacturers, as a group and an industry
in a complex civilization, should absorb the inevitable losses resulting
from the use of their products, "because they are in a better position to
do so, and through their prices to pass such losses on to the community,
at large."'" This has led to the view that such entities are capable, if
held legally responsible, of passing on to users generally those losses
suffered by the few. Thus there has resulted a wider acceptance of the
view that when the benefits of the many come at a high cost to a few,
the many should pay for these losses. While the courts have generally
based liability on a so-called warranty theory, that is, an obligation
arising out of contract, the liability is more in the nature of tort lia-
bility than it is contractual."'
Prosser further delineates the nature of the liability:
What all of this adds up to is that "warranty," as a device for
the justification of strict liability to the consumer, carries far
too much luggage in the way of undesirable complications, and
is leading us down a very thorny path. . . .
. . . Why talk of warranty? If there is to be strict liability in
tort, let there be strict liability in tort, declared outright, with-
out an illusory contract mask... . There are not lacking indica-
tions that some of the courts are about ready to throw away the
crutch, and to admit what they are really doing, when they
say that the warranty is not the one made on the original sale,
and does not run with the goods, but is a new and independent
one made directly to the consumer; and that it does not arise
out of or depend upon any contract, but is imposed by the law,
in tort, as a matter of policy.'"
Chief Justice Traynor, admittedly an apostle of strict liability,
still believes that " [t] he manufacturer's strict liability depends on what
is meant by defective. . . . When the injury is in no way attributable to
a defect, there is no basis for strict liability."8" Proof of a "defect" in
882 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
333 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
834 Id. at 1126-27.
385 Id. at 1133-34.
338 Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 366-67 (1965).
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a product should require the plaintiff to show that the manufacturer sold
an "unreasonably dangerous product," one which involved "unexpected
dangers," or was sold without adequate warning, or which produced an
allergic response not adequately warned against, or contained a harmful
substance not "natural to the product."
Rules of product liability ordinarily applicable to consumer pro-
ducts are not generally appropriate to prescription or ethical drugs,
which are sui generic: they are neither a consumer product, nor are
they intended to be sold over the counter. They are a physician's
product. Drug advertisements are found only in professional jour-
nals, not consumer magazines, and are regulated by the FDA. Rep-
resentations made by the manufacturer in labeling or in medical litera-
ture are directed solely to the medical profession. The manufacturer
does not actually, or even by implication, make known to a patient the
purposes for which a prescription drug is to be used. No product war-
ranty is, therefore, intended to run from the manufacturer to the
patient. The patient does not select a prescription drug for his own use;
rather it is prescribed by his physician. The only common ingredient of
the lawsuit against the product manufacturer of either the consumer
product or the prescription or ethical drug, whether the action sounds
in tort or in breach of warranty, is proof of a specific defect in the pro-
duct. Special rules on warranty and the failure to warn, and strict liabil-
ity in tort of the prescription drug product are needed."' A properly
prepared and marketed product with a proper warning to physicians
should satisfy the legal obligation of the drug manufacturer.'"
The conclusion that "if the drug is safe in theory, but toxic in fact,
the responsibility rests on the pharmaceutical house which takes the
commercial risks of introducing the product, and has done inadequate
testing," and that liability should follow, 889 is too rigid. As Prosser
appreciates:
The whole pharmacopoeia is filled with drugs that are not safe,
even when they are properly made and properly used. A strik-
ing example is rabies vaccine. . . . Is the maker who has done
what can be done to make these things safe to be held liable
when they go wrong? No doubt he must give what warning
he can when the dangers are not likely to be known; no
doubt a product sold without such a warning is to be re-
garded as defective and will subject him to strict liability;
but if he gives such warning is he to be held strictly liable
83T Freedman, Prescription or Ethical Drugs: Fallacies as to Warranties, Failure to
Warn, and Strict Liability in Tort, 21 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 599 (1966).
839 Id. at 615.
339
 Spangenberg, Aspects of Warranties Relating to Defective Prescription Drugs, 37
Colo. L. Rev. 194, 204 (1965).
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for selling the product at all?' [N]o breach of the warranty
is found when the buyer is given what he asks for and expects
to get, even though the whole product is not free from
qualities that cause him loss or damage.'"
[T]he rule which has emerged is that, if the product is safe
for the normal user, there is no liability when it injures the
rare abnormal one, When the manufacturer knows or should
know that there is danger to a substantial number of persons,
even though they constitute only a small percentage of the
population, he is under a duty to give warning; but if he gives
it, he does not become liable merely because he has sold the
product.'"
All this leads rather irresistibly to the conclusion that there is
no strict liability when the product is fit to be sold and reason-
ably safe for use, but it has inherent dangers that no human
skill or knowledge has yet been able to eliminate."
Just as no surgeon can guarantee the success of an operation, no
assurance can ever be given that pharmaceuticals will not produce side
effects from time to time. The guiding rule is that the greatest benefit
for the largest number of patients should be produced. The risk of harm
from allergies or other predisposition to injury from the use of a good
drug that is not unreasonably dangerous should be allocated to the
user so long as the drug is accompanied by appropriate warnings and
instructions. FDA approval of a drug should preclude recovery on strict
liability grounds.8' 4 Simple negligence is the most appropriate of all
of the doctrines that may be employed in this special area because it
has been developed to balance the social desirability of rights and
conduct on both sides of the dispute."'
Strict liability should be imposed only if a drug is unreasonably
dangerous. No drug should be considered unreasonably dangerous
unless, considering all the knowledge existing at the time, no reasonable
manufacturer would market the drug, and no reasonable physician
would administer it. No inference should be made that a drug was
unreasonably dangerous simply because later information prompts
withdrawal of the drug from the market.
Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts was adopted by the
848 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L.
Rev. 791, 808 (1966).
841 Id. at 810.
842 Id. at 811.
848 Id. at 812.
844 Keeton, Some Observations About the Strict Liability of the Maker of Prescrip-
tion Drugs: The Aftermath of MER/29, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 149, 159 (1968).
845 Peterson, Products Liability of Drug Manufacturers, 16 Defense 277, 296-97
(1967).
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American Law Institute three times.'" Tentative Draft Number 6,
adopted in 1961, limited product liability to "food for human consump-
tion." Tentative Draft Number 7, adopted in 1962, included other
products "for intimate bodily use." The final draft, adopted in 1964,
applies "to any product" and provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rules stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
Allergic reactions of susceptible patients do not make a product
"defective." Comment h explicitly states that a "product is not in a
defective condition when it is safe for normal . . . consumption." Com-
ment i examines the question of "defect" in the product by defining
"unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its charac-
teristics." This comment also emphasizes that "many products cannot
possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption," citing the fact that
any product necessarily involves some risks of harm, that is, a food or
drug "from over-consumption," or even sugar which is a "deadly poison
to diabetics." These products are not "unreasonably dangerous," and
hence not defective. No case had then been reported in which a prescrip-
tion drug had actually been termed "unreasonably dangerous."
Comment j states that a product is not "in a defective condition"
if proper or adequate warning is given. The seller may reasonably
assume that the warning will be read and heeded; indeed, "a product
bearing such a warning which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in
a defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Obvious or
patent dangers do not require warnings, and, if the risks are unknown,
warnings obviously cannot be expected; hence, the absence of warnings
846 Prosser, supra note 340, at 793.
847 Restatement (Second) of Torts f 402A (1964).
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in such instances does not make the product defective. Comment j also
points out that "the seller may reasonably assume that those with com-
mon allergies ... will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn
against them." Illustrations under comment j recommend that the seller
warn if the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial or
appreciable number of the population is allergic, if the ingredient is
one whose danger is not generally known, and, if the ingredient is one
whose danger is known, yet it is one which the user would not reason-
ably expect to find in the product. Foreseeability is properly an ele-
ment in the law of strict liability. Where the pure and unadulterated
drug allegedly caused a reaction, and the state of medical knowledge
was such that, at the time of injury, the manufacturer in the exercise
of ordinary care could not have anticipated such a reaction, the manu-
facturer should not be liable to the patient.
Comment k is specifically applicable to drugs:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the
field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to
very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justi-
fied, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defec-
tive, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs
as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller
of such products, again with the qualification that they are
properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liabil-
ity for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an appar-
ently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.
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No distinction is made between investigational drugs and those
whose hazards are definitely known. Medically and practically there
may be a vast difference, and this should be a significantly distin-
guishing legal fact. For example, the comment cites the Pasteur treat-
ment. Once developed, rabies in man is invariably fatal; one out of
seven dies solely from the Pasteur treatment. A patient thus has a choice
of assuming a specific and definitely known calculated risk. This is a
far cry from taking an investigational drug presumably safe but whose
dangers may be entirely unknown. However, if adequate animal studies
are performed, an investigational drug presumably safe, properly pre-
pared and administered, and properly noting all warnings about igno-
rance of side effects, is given to the investigators as adverse effects
become known, the application of comment k should preclude the
imposition of liability for investigational drugs. Irrespective of any
possible implied warranty in a marketed drug, no implied warranty
of safety or efficacy should be imposed for an investigational drug.
While section 402A has not yet been uniformly accepted, the fact
that many courts do rely on the Restatement for other purposes will
in itself probably bring about more widespread adoption of this section.
By the admissions of those who drafted it, the section is not the present
law, but at most the future law, in this important area of product Habil-
ity.248
 Nevertheless, it is considered to be one of the most radical and
spectacular developments in tort law during this century.") According
to Prosser, the date of the fall of the citadel of privity can be fixed with
some certainty in the field of product liability as May 9, 1960, when the
Supreme Court of New Jersey announced its decision in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors8" Within the last few years the courts of twenty-
two states had accepted strict liability as to all products, and five more
states had adopted it by statute. In three others, federal courts, fore-
casting that a change in state law was imminent, concluded that the
rule would be accepted. Two states had not extended the doctrine
beyond products for intimate bodily use, and six restricted it to
foods."'
In a leading case, a California court of appeals dispensed with
privity and the requirement of a sale to the ultimate consumer and
found breach of implied warranties of fitness, merchantability, and
general wholesomeness in the Cutter polio vaccine. 862
 In a later case,
848 Miller, Significant New Concepts of Tort Liability—Strict Liability, 17 Syracuse
L. Rev. 25, 36 (1965).
849
 American Law Institute Meeting, 32 U.S.L.W. 2623, 2627 (1964).
860 32 N.J. 358, 161 A,2d 69 (1960).
881
 Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 Hastings L.J. 9 (1966).
882
 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App, 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960). Few
jurisdictions have adopted this holding.
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another California court of appeal quoted Prosser as suggesting certain
limitations upon the scope of the warranty:
In the ordinary case the maker may also assume a normal
user; and he is not liable where the injury is due to some
allergy or other personal idiosyncrasy of the consumer, found
only in an insignificant percentage of the population. . . .1353
The court concluded that the manufacturer's duty is to guard against
probabilities, not possibilities.'"
Speaking for the California Supreme Court, however, Justice
Traynor said;
The liability is not one governed by the law of contract
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accord-
ingly, rules defining and governing warranties that were
developed to meet the need of commercial transactions cannot
properly be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability
to those injured by its defective products unless those rules
also serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed.'"
Although a more recent case"' seems to indicate that a plaintiff
may go to the jury on a mere showing of injury following the use of
defendant's product,'" California has held that strict liability does not
apply to a claim for failure to warn the ultimate consumer of the
dangerous side effects of a drug. It has spelled out the duty of a product
manufacturer "to warn the doctor who prescribes the drug. This would
be the only effective means by which a warning could help the patient,"
and specifically held that failure to adequately warn the patient of the
known side effects of the drug did not make the product defective.'"
Promotion of an ethical drug product does not involve any direct
advertising to the public. This factor, a New Jersey appellate court
concluded, "casts doubt on the very existence of an implied warranty of
merchantability running from the defendant to the plaintiff."'" In fact,
the patient is seldom aware of the identity of a particular drug admin-
istered by his physician. An overwhelming majority of courts have
steadfastly refused to consider the treating physician as the agent of the
patient in receiving such warranties or representations concerning the
8" W. Prosser, Torts 503 (2nd ed, 1955), quoted in Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.,
214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 352, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 329 (1963).
854 214 Cal. App. 2d at 352, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
855 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901
(1963).
856
 Thomsen v. Reza11 Drug & Chem. Co., 235 Cal. App. 2d 775, 45 Cal. Rptr. 642
(1965).
857 See Condon, Product Liability-1965, 21 Food Drug Cosm. LI. 154 (1966).
858
 Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App, 2d 378, 394, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 192 (1964).
8 5 9
 Kaspirowitz v. Schering Corp., 70 N.J. Super. 397, 403, 175 A.2d 658, 661 (1961).
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product.8" Obviously, in the doctor-patient relationship, there is no
opportunity for a manufacturer to affirm any fact to a patient tending
to induce sale of the product. Accordingly, no logical legal basis exists
for warranty, whether express or implied, to run from the manufacturer
in favor of the patient.
Another essential element of a cause of action for breach of war-
ranty of fitness for particular purpose is reliance by the person seeking
recovery. Since the patient has no voluntary part in the selection or
use of the drug and seldom knows its identity, there is no opportunity
for reliance. An Ohio court of appeals case affirming judgment in favor
of a manufacturer of a prescription drug which allegedly caused a skin
disorder, found no breach of warranty, either express or implied, as
to the plaintiff, because "the record fails to disclose any reliance by the
plaintiff upon anything published or said by the defendant. . . . The
record is completely silent as to any reliance upon the part of the plain-
tiff . . . ."38' The court also emphasized that there was no "affirmation
of fact by the seller as to a product or commodity to induce the purchase
thereof . ."3" Interestingly, the court also found "nothing to indicate
that the doctor relied upon any information furnished by the defendant
in prescribing Aralen for his patient. . . . [So] it can hardly be said
that he relied upon anything produced by the defendant or found in
the general literature."803 Accordingly, without the opportunity to rely
upon the warranty, no reliance can, in fact, exist.
The "unavoidably unsafe product" doctrine is illustrated by the
blood transfusion, following which homologous serum hepatitis may
develop. Despite the most careful screening and selection of blood
donors, the disease is impossible to detect or prevent and is accepted
as a risk inherent in all blood transfusions. Transfusion of blood by a
hospital is averred to be a service, and since there is no sale, there can
be no implied warranty of fitness or merchantability; however, several
courts have very recently rejected this argument B84
Chloramphenicol ("Chloromycetin") should properly be classified
as an "unavoidably unsafe product." It is an excellent broad spectrum
antibiotic but also a power antimetabolite. Unfortunately, despite the
cautionary statements in the advertising literature, in the medication
packet, in medical journals, and in the lay press, physicians continue
Boo See, e.g., Moehlenbrock v. Parke Davis & Co., 141 Minn. 154, 169 N.W. 541
(1918); Krom v. Sharpe & Dohme, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1958);
Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 191 Misc. 285, 77 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. Spec.
T. 1948).
HI Oppenheimer v. Sterling Drug Co., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 110, 219 N.E.2d 54, 59
(1964).
362 Id.
863 Id. at 108-09, 219 N.E.2d at 58-59.
Boo See Boland, Strict Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood, 23
Ark. L. Rev. 236 (1969).
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to ignore the warnings. The drug has been prescribed for common colds
and other common infections that are self-limited and in which either
no treatment or relatively harmless drugs can be used.'" It is still the
drug of choice for typhoid fever, may be Life saving in other instances,
and should remain available when needed. Since it may cause significant
bone marrow depression in rare cases, each time it is prescribed for
non-indicated use a patient is placed at needless risk. When so used,
despite the precautionary data, and adverse effects occur, the physi-
cian is negligent, not the drug company.
There is no warranty, express or implied, as to the absolute effec-
tiveness of a drug for a specific condition."' Strict liability has been
applied only to the manufacturer or distributor of defective drugs. A
hospital is not answerable for the quality of the drugs it administers.
Strict liability in tort or alleged breach of express and implied war-
ranties for the intravenous injection of bacterially contaminated
dextran is not applicable to the hospital."' Breach of express warranty,
however, may extend to a physician who warrants that a drug or device
is safe for human use, and the warranty is breached.'"
The variation among jurisdictions is particularly exemplified by
the contradictory outcomes in cases involving "MER/29" which was
marketed after known adverse reactions in animals were deliberately
withheld. In some trial courts, plaintiffs have been awarded substan-
tial damages. The largest award was $350,000 in compensatory and
$850,000 in punitive damages. The Supreme Court of New York, on
motion by Richardson-Merrell, Inc., the defendant, left standing the
compensatory damages but reduced the punitive damages to $100,000.
Whether the punitive damages will be affirmed on appeal remains to
be determined 869
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
a New York case overturned an award of $100,000 punitive damages
against Richardson-Merrell, Inc., but affirmed $17,500 compensation
for alleged side effects of "MER/29."3" The opinion noted that puni-
tive damages could have a "stagering" effect because of the hundreds
of cases pending and could have a long range effect on the entire
pharmaceutical industry. Damages could run to "tens of millions. . . .
We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive
868 Hosp. Trib., March 11, 1968, at 4, col. 3.
306 Butler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 202 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
807 Shivers v. Good Shepherd Hosp. Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
368 Godard v. Ridgway, 445 P.2d 757 (Wy. 1968). The court failed to fully consider
patient's cause of action against her physician for breach of warranty; but remanded the
entire case for retrial, thereby leaving the issue open.
369 Drug News Weekly, January 9, 1967, at 8, col. 4. Some 99 percent of the
MER/29 cases have been settled. Drug News Weekly, January 30, 1967, at 14, col. 1.
870 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
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damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can
be so administered as to avoid overkill."'" Of course, the judge's rea-
soning is illogical. If the law provides a remedy, difficulty in adminis-
tration or unequal application does not justify its rejection.
A federal district court in Illinois held that a patient who devel-
oped cataracts from the use of "MER/29" had a good cause of action
for breach of implied warranty against the manufacturer-distributor,
notwithstanding lack of privity of contract.'
Other courts have reached a different result, although on the same
reasoning. Texas denied recovery for breach of warranty to an indi-
vidual who developed cataracts because of an unusual susceptibility to
"MER/29" at a time when the manufacturer could not have foreseen
such a reaction." A federal court, applying Maryland law, ruled that
privity of contract is required between plaintiff and drug manufacturer
in an action for breach of warranty.TM4 Florida, affirming the dismissal
of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action in a case involving
"MER/29", held that no action for breach of implied warranty will
lie against the druggist for injury sustained as a result of the nature
of the drug, as opposed to any foreign matter or impurities in it, which
has been approved for sale by federal authorities acting pursuant to
federal law, and which has been dispensed on the prescription of a
physician."' The Oregon Supreme Court in a case involving "MER/
29" concluded that a drug properly tested, labeled with appropriate
warnings, approved by the FDA and marketed properly under federal
regulations, is, as a matter of law, a reasonably safe product, and the
manufacturer is not liable in the breach of warranty to a user who
suffered adverse effects, in the absence of evidence of defective manu-
facturing or impurities in the drug."
In a landmark case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with one
dissent, specifically adopted section 402A as the law of Pennsylvania.'"
The extent to which this will be applied to drugs remains to be seen.
It is noteworthy that Pennsylvania has held that an action for breach
871
 Id. at 839.
872 Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (ED. Ill. 1964).
878 Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
874 Blum V. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 906 (D. Md. 1965).
875 McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., 167 So. 2d 901 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 1964). This
case was based on breach of implied warranty brought by purchasers; therefore no ques-
tion of privity was raised.
870 Lewis v. Baker, 243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966).
877 Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). The dissent by Chief Justice
Bell refers to the holding as "revolutionary," "unfair," "unjustifiable," and "liability
without fault." The rule requiring privity of contract to enable a purchaser to sue a
manufacturer for breach of implied warranty was expressly abolished by Kassab v. Central
Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1960.
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of implied warranty, whether for personal injury or property damage,
is governed by the four-year statute of limitations contained in the
U.C.C.,878
 rather than the two-year personal injury statute governing
personal injury actions in Pennsylvania 879
 Additional states continue
to adopt the section88° as the frontal assault against the ancient citadel
of privity progresses, and negligence and warranty become supple-
mented by the doctrine of "strict liability."
878 U.C.C. if 2-725.
879
 Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
8813
 Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Ore, 1967) ; Dippel v. &inn°, 37 Wis.
2d 433, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) ; O.S. Stepley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz, 556, 447 Pad 248
(1968).
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